Generative Adversarial Networks

www.cs.wisc.edu/~page/cs760/
Goals for the lecture

you should understand the following concepts

- Nash equilibrium
- Minimax game
- Generative adversarial network
Prisoners’ Dilemma

Two suspects in a major crime are held in separate cells. There is enough evidence to convict each of them of a minor offense, but not enough evidence to convict either of them of the major crime unless one of them acts as an informer against the other (defects). If they both stay quiet, each will be convicted of the minor offense and spend one year in prison. If one and only one of them defects, she will be freed and used as a witness against the other, who will spend four years in prison. If they both defect, each will spend three years in prison.

Players: The two suspects.

Actions: Each player’s set of actions is {Quiet, Defect}.

Preferences: Suspect 1’s ordering of the action profiles, from best to worst, is (Defect, Quiet) (he defects and suspect 2 remains quiet, so he is freed), (Quiet, Quiet) (he gets one year in prison), (Defect, Defect) (he gets three years in prison), (Quiet, Defect) (he gets four years in prison). Suspect 2’s ordering is (Quiet, Defect), (Quiet, Quiet), (Defect, Defect), (Defect, Quiet).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspect1/ Suspect 2</th>
<th>Quiet</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quiet</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 represents best outcome, 0 worst, etc.
Nash Equilibrium

Let \((S, f)\) be a game with \(n\) players, where \(S_i\) is the strategy set for player \(i\), 
\[ S = S_1 \times S_2 \times \cdots \times S_n \] 
is the set of strategy profiles and 
\[ f(x) = (f_1(x), \ldots, f_n(x)) \] 
is its payoff function evaluated at \(x \in S\). Let \(x_i\) be a strategy profile of player \(i\) and \(x_{-i}\) be a strategy profile of all players except for player \(i\). When each player \(i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\) chooses strategy \(x_i\) resulting in strategy profile \(x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) then player \(i\) obtains payoff \(f_i(x)\). Note that the payoff depends on the strategy profile chosen, i.e., on the strategy chosen by player \(i\) as well as the strategies chosen by all the other players. A strategy profile \(x^* \in S\) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player, that is 

\[ \forall i, x_i \in S_i : f_i(x_i^*, x_{-i}^*) \geq f_i(x_i, x_{-i}^*). \]

Thanks, Wikipedia.
Another Example

Thanks, Prof. Osborne of U. Toronto, Economics
...And Another Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Player 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thanks again, Prof. Osborne of U. Toronto, Economics
Minimax with Simultaneous Moves

• *maximin* value: largest value player can be assured of *without* knowing other player’s actions

$$v_i = \max_{a_i} \min_{a_{-i}} v_i(a_i, a_{-i})$$

Where:

- \( i \) is the index of the player of interest.
- \(-i\) denotes all other players except player \( i \)

• *minimax* value: smallest value other players can force this player to receive *without* knowing this player’s action

$$\bar{v}_i = \min_{a_{-i}} \max_{a_i} v_i(a_i, a_{-i})$$

• *minimax* is an upper bound on *maximin*
Key Result

- **Utility**: numeric reward for actions

- **Game**: 2 or more players take turns or take simultaneous actions. Moves lead to states, states have utilities.

- Game is like an optimization problem, but each player tries to maximize own objective function (utility function)

- **Zero-sum game**: each player’s gain or loss in utility is exactly balanced by others’

- **In zero-sum game, Minimax solution is same as Nash Equilibrium**
Generative Adversarial Networks

• **Approach:** Set up zero-sum game between deep nets to
  – **Generator:** Generate data that looks like training set
  – **Discriminator:** Distinguish between real and synthetic data

• **Motivation:**
  – Building accurate generative models is hard (e.g., *learning and sampling* from Markov net or Bayes net)
  – Want to use all our great progress on *supervised learners* to do this *unsupervised* learning task better
  – Deep nets may be our favorite supervised learner, especially for image data, if nets are convolutional (use tricks of sliding windows with parameter tying, cross-entropy transfer function, batch normalization)
Does It Work?

Ground Truth  |  MSE  |  Adversarial

Thanks, Ian Goodfellow, NIPS 2016 Tutorial on GANS, for this and most of what follows…
A Bit More on GAN Algorithm

\[ D(x) \text{ tries to be near 1} \]

Differentiable function \( D \)

\[ x \text{ sampled from data} \]

\[ D \text{ tries to make } D(G(z)) \text{ near 0, } \]
\[ G \text{ tries to make } D(G(z)) \text{ near 1} \]

\[ D \]

\[ x \text{ sampled from model} \]

Differentiable function \( G \)

Input noise \( z \)
The Rest of the Details

- Use deep convolutional neural networks for Discriminator D and Generator G

- Let $x$ denote trainset and $z$ denote random, uniform input

- Set up zero-sum game by giving D the following objective, and G the negation of it:

$$
-\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{data}} \log D(x) - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_{z} \log (1 - D(G(z)))
$$

- Let D and G compute their gradients simultaneously, each make one step in direction of the gradient, and repeat until neither can make progress... Minimax
Not So Fast

• While preceding version is theoretically elegant, in practice the gradient for G vanishes before we reach best practical solution

• While no longer true Minimax, use same objective for D but change objective for G to:

\[-\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_z \log D(G(z))\]

• Sometimes better if instead of using one minibatch at a time to compute gradient and do batch normalization, we also have a fixed subset of training set, and use combination of fixed subset and current minibatch
Comments on GANs

- Potentially can use our high-powered supervised learners to build better, faster data generators (can they replace MCMC, etc.?)

- While some nice theory based on Nash Equilibria, better results in practice if we move a bit away from the theory

- In general, many in ML community have strong concern that we don’t really understand why deep learning works, including GANs

- Still much research into figuring out why this works better than other generative approaches for some types of data, how we can improve performance further, how to take these from image data to other data types where CNNs might not be the most natural deep network structure