Experiences Deploying A Large-Scale Emergent Network

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Introduction

“Mojo Nation” is a network for robust, decentralized file storage and transfer. It was first released to the public in August, 2000, and has been in continuous operation ever since. Over 100,000 people have downloaded and used the Mojo Nation software. Mojo Nation has incorporated some of the ideas published in the literature, and observations of the resulting network show that in the context of our user base and their characteristic behavior, we were able to gain benefit from some of those ideas but not from others. In addition, the problems which currently cause the Mojo Nation network to fail or to perform badly are problems not yet directly addressed by the literature, suggesting opportunities for future research.

Background

Mojo Nation[1] is not a file-sharing system (like Gnutella or Napster), but a file store, in which the storage, transfer and naming of files is performed in a distributed manner, independent of any individual node. It has much in common with systems like CFS[2], PAST[3] and OceanStore[4], both in goals and in design. Mojo Nation was designed from the start with ambitious goals of attack-resistance and scalability.

The first version of Mojo Nation was released to the public in August of 2000. It had many advanced features, but deployment to large numbers of end users inevitably revealed its architectural deficiencies. In the ensuing months we have deployed literally hundreds of changes to the protocol in response to observed behavior and in order to take advantage of newly discovered techniques. For example, in August of 2001, shortly after reading a pre-print of the Chord paper[5], we deployed a new version that used consistent hashing to locate a block in a set of servers.

We have typically delivered more than 10,000 downloads of the Mojo Nation software per month, as shown by statistics published by SourceForge.net[6]. (Note that before August of 2001 downloads were not hosted by SourceForge, although some of the web pages were. The higher number of page views in October of 2000 were a result of Mojo Nation being featured on slashdot.org, the consequences of which will be described below.)

Observed Behavior

Frequent Join / Leave

The most surprising and problematic behavior that users of Mojo Nation display is frequent joining and leaving. We observed that the most common behavior is to join the net-
work, stay connected for less than an hour, then leave the network and never return. Measurements taken from two particular 1-month periods (October, 2000 and February, 2001) indicated that between 80% and 84% of the users fell into this group of “one-time, less than one hour” group, and that of the remaining 16% to 20%, a significant fraction stayed connected for less than 24 hours then permanently disconnected.

Even among the remaining persistent nodes (those that recurrently connected to the network over a period of weeks), the typical node remained connected for only a short consecutive time, and only few times per week! One measurement taken in April 2001 showed that the average node was connected 0.28 of the time, and other, less systematic observations suggest that the distribution is highly skewed, with approximately 1/6 of the nodes connected almost all the time, and the rest connected approximately 3 hours per day.

Varying Space Allocation

The default disk allocation per node in Mojo Nation was originally 100 MB. In April of 2001 we raised the default to 500 MB. Users can manually adjust that setting. The Mojo Nation software does not report to us what settings the user chooses, but we do know from support mail and user feedback that no users have complained about the default setting, and that many users are quick to point out that they have raised their limit to a high setting, usually in the range of 10 GB to 60 GB.

Varying Connection Quality

Market research reports (e.g. [7]) typically suggest that around 13% of Internet users have broadband connections, and the rest use relatively slow and intermittent) dial-up connections. Anecdotal evidence from Mojo Nation is consistent with this. However, there is an active minority of users with very high quality connections (including academic and corporate networks). These users also tend to be in the minority that stay consistently connected and in the minority that allocate large amounts of disk space.

Routability

Measurements taken at various times over the life of the Mojo Nation network have always returned the same answer: 1/3 of Mojo Nation nodes are not directly reachable from the Internet, as observed by the fact that they do not have routeable IP addresses. In addition, some unknown number of users may have routeable IP addresses, but may still be behind firewalls that do not allow incoming TCP connections.

Which Parts Work?

Mojo Nation is a complex system and it is difficult to ascribe its successes to individual components. It can be described in general as a file storage and transfer network in which there is a mechanism for global coordination without communication (e.g. consistent hashing to locate nodes and data blocks in a ring), and in which individual nodes and pairs of nodes make decisions using local information about how to store, transmit, replicate and cache data. When Mojo Nation works, it is a demonstration that such a
network can be deployed and operated in an environment made up of unmanaged volunteers.

When Mojo Nation fails, its failures can more easily be ascribed to particular design elements.

Which Parts Fail? (Open Problems)

Original Introduction

The only failures which have rendered the network completely unusable for all new users (not counting occurrences of the authors releasing a new version with fatal bugs), are failures of original introduction. “Original introduction” is the problem of how a node connects to the network for the first time, when it does not yet have any connections to any other nodes in the network. The first version of Mojo Nation used single central introducer. Each new node would contact that introducer and receive in response a list of other nodes.

The Great Slashdotting of October 2000 was a dramatic demonstration of the inherent weakness in this design. In October 2000 an entry was posted on the popular web site slashdot.org headlined: “Forget Napster & Gnutella: Enter Mojo Nation”[8]. The next day our web server reported that downloads of the software had rocketed from 300 copies per day to almost 10,000 copies per day. The central introducer was totally overloaded and was not returning any responses to any users. We struggled for days to make the server operate, but it wasn’t until the flash crowd had died down and we took the time to implement a new system of introduction (involving multiple redundant but still centrally managed introducers), that the network became usable again.

The issue of original introduction is largely ignored by the extant literature. There are several solutions to the problem in use on currently deployed networks including redundant centrally-administered introducers (FastTrack, Mojo Nation), bundling a list of original contacts with the download of the software (Limewire, Freenet), asking users to manually configure the original connection (Freenet), and combinations of more than one of these techniques (Limewire).

The scalability, security and attack-resistance trade-offs implicit in these design decisions have not been publically analyzed as far as we know.

Data Availability

Even when the network as a whole is working, a very common failure mode is that the data that a user seeks to download is unavailable. We ascribe the source of that problem to our design’s failure to accommodate the highly unreliable behavior of the nodes.

We have repeatedly tuned our replication and information dispersal design in order to counteract this problem, but even today data availability is variable, and appears to depend upon which server nodes are connected at the time an observation is made.

As noted in the “Future Research” section of the CFS paper, the issue of how to manage block storage in the face of servers joining and leaving remains mostly open. More sophisticated caching and replication strategies will hopefully ameliorate this problem. In addition “reputation” or “trust metric” techniques such as described the section on “Attack Resistance” below might help by dis-
criminating against unreliable servers. Mojo Nation has deployed software which attempts to do exactly that, but the interaction between this discrimination and other design goals is not well analyzed.

Other Open Problems

Bypassing Firewalls and NAT

The challenge of enabling nodes that live behind firewalls or NAT to act as servers is a challenge that most deployed systems do not yet attempt to address. It is also likely to become more rather than less important in the future as the size of the Internet grows and as application-level connections cross more administrative boundaries.

Mojo Nation uses a “relay” technique in which a third node helps two firewalled nodes to communicate with one another, similar in principle to the AVES system[9].

Attack Resistance / Malicious Nodes / Mutual Distrust / Motivation to Cooperate

Perhaps the most challenging unsolved problem is that of mutual distrust. While a network architect is tempted to assume that all nodes in the system behave as he designed them to behave, this assumption may prove fatal once a network is deployed into multiple disjoint administrative zones.

A fundamentally related issue is that of “motivation to cooperate”. Why does a node choose to offer services to the network as well as to make requests of the network? Is there anything preventing a user from altering their copy of the software, or writing their own compatible implementation, which uses the resources of the other nodes but refuses to provide its own resource to them?

Also closely related is the notion of “attack resistance”. If a node can use the resources of other nodes without offering them service in return, then it is able to act as a drain on the resources of the network as a whole, possibly constituting an attack on the network.

On the other hand, if a node can be coerced into cooperating, perhaps by cutting that node off from the services of the network in retaliation for its lack of cooperation, how can we be sure that the same mechanism cannot be used to attack specific (innocent) nodes, or even to attack the network itself?

Hopefully the research pursued in papers like [10] and [11] will lead to a quantitatively justified method of gaining attack resistance without sacrificing other design goals.

Mojo Nation’s experience shows that there are two kinds of attack that are likely to be encountered by any network that is deployed in a large scale on the Internet.

The first attack is when a user alters his client in the attempt to gain more advantage for himself. Several different users have made such modifications to their Mojo Nation software and then helpfully contacted us to describe what they did. Other users have made modifications, but we are aware of those changes only indirectly through observations of anomalous behavior.

The second kind of attack is when an enemy attempts to remove central components of the network through legal means. Legal action was recently initiated[12] against the Fast Track network even though the only centrally administered components are the original introducer service and the design, implementation and distribution of the software.
References

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