[millennium] Asiaweek roundtable on ASEAN, security

[Alexander H L Vu <vuh000@mail.Uni-Mainz.DE>]

Hi all,

i am back after a long absence. greetings to all. as you can see in the
media, people have beginned to celebrate the millennium, some by casting
their visions in the future. in order to keep our vnsa population
informed about what people around the world are thinking about our
common future i will forward the stuffs i find on the web which is
related to this topic. Today the Asiaweek roundtable on ASEAN, security.
Hope this wil give you some imagination about the condition our country is
faced in the ASEAN context.

Lam
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http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/99/0820/cs30.html

THE ASIAWEEK ROUNDTABLE ON
                               ASEAN

 Divining the way forward for Southeast Asia's tough issues



They're called the "second track": think-tank types backstopping the
ministers at meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Officially, they are the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and
International Studies, or in the grouping's acronym-speak,
ASEAN-ISIS. Of course, they're smart and super-informed, perfect
for divining the future of ASEAN around a discussion table. So last
month Asiaweek got together with six think-tank chiefs: Hadi
Soesastro and Jusuf Wanandi, directors of Indonesia's Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Simon Tay, chairman of the
Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a nominated MP; and
politics professor Carolina Hernandez, founding president of the
Philippines' Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. Also at
the two-hour discussion in Singapore's Sheraton were Suchit
Bunbongkarn, executive board chairperson and director of the
Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn
University, and Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, director-general of
Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies. Excerpts of
the animated exchange moderated by Assistant Managing Editor
Ricardo Saludo:

REGIONAL SECURITY

Hernandez: When you look at security in a broader context, the
transformations of societies in Southeast and Northeast Asia will
further contribute to the complication of various issues. An increasing
number of Taiwanese would like to see their country apart and
separate from China. This is going to intensify, in my view, and could
also have an impact on how China will look at other issues in the
region, including the South China Sea. Being from the Philippines, I
tend to look at China as a real problem for us in the region. It's a
country that has not had enough interaction with the rest of the region
in a cooperative way. It's also a country that sees itself as having
been disadvantaged by relations with big powers in the past century
and into this century. So, I think, what it will want to do is to narrow
[the gap between] that reality and their perception of themselves as a
great power.

Wanandi: One of the most critical factors for the longer term is, of
course, how the United States-China relationship is going to turn out.
What is critical is that these two can come to some kind of modus
vivendi or cooperation. Otherwise, if we have to choose between
those two powers, at this stage, it will be a very, very difficult choice
for us.

Tay: If we take the attitude that they [the Chinese] are the enemy,
they will be. ASEAN must engage China fully, stand up when it's
pushed, but talk reasonably when they seem to do so. Everyone has
emphasized China-U.S. [relations] . . . but until there is some sort of
historic reconciliation between Japan and China, there will always be
tensions.

Jawhar: Focusing on Southeast Asia, I think it is going to be generally
a peaceful region - generally. But where can the problems come
from? First, depending on what we understand by security, for the
immediate future as well as into the longer term, our greatest security
problem will be our economics - the problem of poverty, which will
also impact on security. Then, of course, inequality of incomes, of
opportunities. Also the gap between the richer and the poorer
countries. Second, our problem will be managing political change.
That doesn't mean security problems will be greatest only in the least
democratically developed countries. The more democratically
developed countries want further democracy. If they manage it
poorly, they will also have security crises. Turning to external
[security], if you are thinking 10, 20 years, bilateral as well as
regional,
our problem would be managing and resolving as far as possible the
territorial disputes on land and sea. Finally, there's the challenge and
opportunity of China.

Soesastro: Perhaps the last issue on security is whether the region,
in the next 10 to 15 years or so, can develop a kind of regional
security structure. We have China in this region, Japan and the United
States. We need to have a structure in which we can bring them in
[and] incorporate the sources of uncertainty within the group.

Suchit: To what extent can ASEAN work together to enhance
military security? We seem to rely more on the U.S. as the balancing
power in the region. But we are not very sure in the next 10, 15 years
what will be the role of the U.S. Look at Kosovo: the U.S. seems to put
the issue of human rights
above national sovereignty. If that is so, to what extent will the U.S.
use this to force countries in the
region on human rights issues, democratization and so on? At the same
time, we are not willing to
work together in ASEAN, [in terms of] closer cooperation in the military
sphere.

Hernandez: One of the critical problems is the absence of a common
perception about security.
Unless we address this, I don't think we will see greater cooperation in
the military field. The other
hurdle is changing the mindset. ASEAN was formed to isolate the region
from great-power rivalry.
Our leaders took great pains to explain to the world that we don't intend
to be a traditional military
alliance.

Tay: In the next 20 years, if the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum] gets its act
together and we do
move toward preventive diplomacy and, after that, to dispute resolution,
these are worthwhile
contributions to the regional architecture and tools to sustain peace,
particularly for our region. I also
hesitate to think about hard security cooperation in a much thicker, more
detailed way. Additionally,
if you look at the Cold War and Europe, it was clear who the enemy was.
I'm afraid that if we in the
next 20 years try to recreate that, the tendency will be to look at China
as the enemy and the U.S. on
our side, as it is in NATO. I'm not sure that's a scenario any of us would
want. So there are good
reasons to go faster, if possible, on the soft security [moves] and
slower, if necessary, on the hard
security.

Jawhar: We must cooperate more not only with one another, but with
countries outside our own
region. This includes China. It must be very clear to friend and potential
foe alike: ASEAN as well
as its members are very constructive players for security in the region,
but we will not go the way of
military pacts. Instead (and I'm going now to Northeast Asia and
Asia-Pacific), we should be a force
for military moderation, of demilitarization, counter-proliferation, etc.
We should be a force for
reducing rather than enhancing arms.

Wanandi: It's not that we have to stop our [soft-security] approaches. The
problem for me is
whether that is adequate for the future. Is this whole Northeast Asian
problem going to impact on us
in a negative way and we cannot do very much? It's fine to say we have to
continue this and that,
but, first, the reality is that it [the diplomatic approach] is not
happening, and, second, we are going to
be much more aligned individually with the United States than before -
just for security.

Hernandez: For ASEAN to be a force in the ARF, we've got to get our act
together. And right
now our act is individual; we are making separate agreements with the
major powers, and this is
what I am personally afraid of. If we do this, then ASEAN cannot act as a
force, because among
ourselves we cannot even agree. So we need to be more proactive, we need
to cooperate more.