Fine-Grained Fault Tolerance using Device Checkpoints

Asim Kadav with Matthew Renzelmann and Michael M. Swift University of Wisconsin-Madison



The (old) elephant in the room

2



3rd party developers

device drivers (majority of kernel code)

OS

kernel

The (old) elephant in the room

2



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OS

kernel

The (old) elephant in the room



3rd party developers

device drivers (majority of kernel code)

OS kernel

Recipe for disaster

Improvement	System	Va	lidation	
		Drivers	Bus	Classes
Isolation	Nooks ^[SOSP 03]	6	I	2
	XFI [OSDI 06]	2	I	- 1
	CuriOS ^[OSDI 08]	2	I	2
Type Safety	SafeDrive ^[OSDI 06]	6	2	3
	Singularity ^[Eurosys 06]	I	I	I I
Specification	Nexus ^[OSDI 08]	2	I	2
	Termite ^[SOSP 09]	2	I	2
Recovery	Shadow Drivers ^[OSDI 04]	13	I	3
Static analysis tools	Windows SDV [Eurosys 06]	All	All	All
	Coverity [CACM 10]	All	All	All
	Cocinelle ^[Eurosys 08]	All	All	All


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
Improvement	System	Validation		on
		Drivers	Bus	Classes
Isolation	Nooks ^[SOSP 03]	6	Ι	2
apply to	Observation I: Solutions that limit changes to kernel and apply to lots of drivers have real impact			
Type Safety	SafeDrive [030100] Singularity ^[Eurosys 06]	b I	L I	3
Specification	Nexus ^[OSDI 08]	2	I	2
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Observation 2: Most systems focus on improving isolation and detection and not on recovery			ng	

Driver failure recovery limited to driver restart




Driver failure recovery limited to driver restart




Driver failure recovery limited to driver restart

- *** Restart driver upon failure**
 - * Safedrive and MINIX approach
 - *** Can break applications**


- * Restart and replay upon failure
 - ***** Shadow driver approach
 - ***** Always record state of driver
 - * Perform restart and log replay upon failure
 - ***** Transparent to applications




Problem I: Restart based driver recovery is slow




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
Driver re-initialization probes hardware again



Driver re-initialization probes hardware again




Driver re-initialization probes hardware again



***** What does slow device re-initialization hurt?

- ***** Fault tolerance: Driver recovery
- *** Virtualization: Live migration**
- *** OS functions: Fast reboot**

Problem 2: Shadow drivers assume drivers follow class behavior




***** Class definition includes:

* Callbacks registered with the bus, device and kernel subsystem

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Problem 2: Shadow drivers assume drivers follow class behavior



***** Class definition includes:


* Callbacks registered with the bus, device and kernel subsystem

How many drivers follow class behavior and how much code does this add and

Problem 2(a): Drivers do behave outside class definitions

- *** Non-class behavior that affects recovery:**
 - procfs/sysfs interactions and unique ioctls

DW1520 Wireless-N WLAN Half-Mini Car	rd Properties	x
General Advanced Driver Details Po	ower Management	
The following properties are available for the the property you want to change on the left on the right.		
Property:	Value:	
Disable Upon Wired Connect Fragmentation Threshold IBSS 54g(tm) Protection Mode IBSS Mode Locally Administered MAC Address	USA	•
Location Minimum Power Consumption PLCP Header Priority & VLAN Rate (802.11a) Rate (802.11b/g)		



Windows WLAN card config via private ioctls

Linux sound card config via sysfs

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Problem 2(a): Drivers do behave outside class definitions

- *** Non-class behavior that affects recovery:**
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
D	W1520 Wireless-N WLAN Half-Mini Card Properties
	The following properties are available for this network adapter. Click the property you want to change on the left, and then select its value on the right. Property: Value:
	Disable Upon Wired Connect Fragmentation Threshold IBSS 54g(tm) Protection Mode IBSS Mode Locally Administered MAC Address
	PLCP Header Priority & VLAN Rate (802.11a) Rate (802.11b/g)

Windows WLAN card config via private ioctls

Linux sound card config via sysfs

At least 16% of drivers have non-class behavior and may not recover correctly using shadow drivers


Problem 2(b): Too many classes



* "Understanding Modern Device Drivers" ASPLOS 2012

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
Problem 2(b): Too many classes



Class-specific driver recovery leads to a large kernel recovery subsystem

* "Understanding Modern Device Drivers" ASPLOS 2012

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Fine-grained Isolation

* Runs driver entry points like transactions
* Relies on code generation to limit new code in kernel

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Checkpoint-based recovery

* Provides fast and correct recovery semantics

Fine-grained Isolation

Runs driver entry points like transactions
Relies on code generation to limit new code in kernel

Checkpoint-based recovery

* Provides fast and correct recovery semantics

* Requires incremental overhead/changes to drivers
* Shifts burden of fault tolerance to faulty code


Outline


Introduction


Fine-grained isolation


Checkpoint-based recovery


Evaluation and Conclusions













***** Provide fault tolerance to specific driver entry points



- ***** Provide fault tolerance to specific driver entry points
- Can be applied to untested code or code marked suspicious by static or runtime tools

Transactional support through code generation



Transactional support through code generation

u

b

S

driver


network


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
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
S







- ***** Detects and recovers from:
 - * Memory errors like invalid pointer accesses
 - * Structural errors like malformed structures
 - ***** Processor exceptions like divide by zero, stack corruption



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
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Fine-grained isolation


Checkpoint-based recovery

Conclusion


★Easy to capture memory state



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
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* Device state is not captured

*** Device configuration space**


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* Device state is not captured

- *** Device configuration space**
- *** Internal device registers and counters**


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- *** Device configuration space**
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
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- *** Unique for every device**

★Easy to capture memory state



- *** Memory buffer addresses used for DMA**
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Intuition with power management



* Refactor power management code for device checkpoints
 * Correct: Developer captures unique device semantics
 * Fast: Avoids probe and latency critical for applications

***** Ask developers to export checkpoint/restore in their drivers

Suspend



Restore config state
Restore register state
Restore or reset DMA state
Re-attach/Enable device
Device Ready

Suspend

Resume



Save register state



.

Suspend device

Restore config state
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Save DMA state


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
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
Checkpoint


Restore





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
Suspend/resume code provides device checkpoint functionality



































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- ***** Atomicity: All or nothing execution
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 - ***** Re-use existing device locks to lock driver
 - *** Two phase locking**

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 - ***** Device state: Explicitly checkpoint/restore state
- ***** Isolation: Serialization to hide incomplete transactions
 - ***** Re-use existing device locks to lock driver
 - *** Two phase locking**
- * Consistency: Only valid (kernel, driver and device) states
 - ***** Higher level mechanisms to rollback external actions
 - ***** At most once device action guarantee to applications

Outline

Introduction

Fine-grained isolation

Checkpoint-based recovery

Evaluation & Conclusions

Evaluation platform

***** Criterion :

- ***** Latency of recovery: How fast is it?
- *** Correctness of recovery: How well does it work?**
- *** Incremental effort: How much work is it?**
- ***** Performance: How much does it cost?

Evaluation platform

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
***** Platform :


- *** Implemented in Linux 2.6.29**
- * 2.5 GHz Intel Core 2 Quad core w/ 4 GB DDR2 DRAM
- * Six drivers across three classes


Driver	Class	Bus
8139too	net	PCI
e1000	net	PCI
r8169	net	PCI
pegasus	net	USB
psmouse	sound	PCI
ens I 37 I	input	serio

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Recovery times		Recovery speedup				
2,000ms					start rec FT reco	-
1,500ms						
1,000ms						
500ms						
0ms	8139too	e1000	pegasus	r8169	ens 1371	psmouse







Static and dynamic fault injection

Driver	Injected Faults	Native Crashes
8139too	43	43
e1000	47	47
r8169	36	36
pegasus	34	33
ens I 37 I	22	21
psmouse	46	46
TOTAL	258	256

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FGFT recovers from multiple failures : I) restores non-class state and 2) does not affect other threads

Programming effort


Driver LOC		Isolation a	nnotations	Recovery additions	
		Driver annotations			LOC Added
8139too	I, 904	15	20	26	4
e1000	13,973	32		32	10
r8169	2, 993	10		17	5
pegasus	1,541	26	12	22	5
ens I 37 I	2,110	23	66	16	6
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
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ens I 37 I	2,110	23	66	16	6
psmouse	2, 448		19	19	6

FGFT requires a loadable kernel module (1200 LOC) and 38 lines of kernel changes to trap processor exceptions






e1000 Network Card



CPU: 2.4%


e1000 Network Card




e1000 Network Card



e1000 Network Card




e1000 Network Card



FGFT can isolate and recover high bandwidth devices at low overhead without adding kernel subsystems

Summary



Summary

*** FGFT runs driver code as transactions**

 Provides fault tolerance at incremental performance and programmer efforts

Introduced device checkpoints
 Provides fast and complete recovery semantics

 Fast device checkpoints should be explored in other domains like fast reboot, upgrade etc.

Questions

Asim Kadav

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- * kadav@cs.wisc.edu
- ***** Graduating in spring!




Unlike suspend, devices continue to be accessed after a checkpoint

* Rely on drivers following ACPI specifications for correctness


Latency for device checkpoint/restore

Driver	Class	Bus	Checkpoint Times	Restore Times
8139too	net	PCI	33µs	62µs
e1000	net	PCI	32µs	280ms
r8169	net	PCI	26µs	30µs
pegasus	net	USB	0µs	4ms
ens I 37 I	sound	PCI	33µs	lllms
psmouse	input	serio	0µs	390ms


Fast checkpoint/restore using suspend/resume



Static modifications



Static modifications



Static modifications

