## NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS

Kai Mast CS639/839 Spring 2023

# **ANNOUCEMENT: UPCOMING TALKS**

## Natacha Crooks (UC Berkeley)

"Basil, a new transactional Byzantine Fault Tolerant key-value store"

- Friday (2/24) at noon
- Computer Sciences 2310 (limited space)

## Lorenzo Alvisi (Cornell)

"Orderrr! A tale of Money, Intrigue, and Specifications"

- Monday (2/27) at noon
- Via Zoom

# AGENDA

## **Basics**

- Recap: Peer-to-Peer Networks
- Gossip Protocols
- What is Consensus?

## Break 1


## Nakamoto Consensus

### Break 2

## **More Details**

- Block Size and Block Frequency
- GHOST

# **RECAP: PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS**



- Not all nodes are known to everybody else
- No fixed topology
- Each node is only connected to a few peers

# **MESSAGE PROPAGATION**

How does a message, e.g., a transaction, reach all nodes in a network?

**Naive Solution:** Directly send the message to every node in the network

#### Why does that not work?

- There are many (hundreds) of nodes
- Not all nodes may be known
  - We cannot directly talk to them

### **More Challenges**

- Need to tolerate network failures
- Nodes might join or leave at any time

# **GOSSIP PROTOCOLS**

**Idea:** Use the peer-to-peer network to *disseminate* message across the network

## Approach:

- When you create a message, send it to all your peers
- When you receive a message, send it to all your peers

## Very Scalable:

Each node only needs to forward message to a constant number of peers, independent of the network size

## **Failure resilient:**

If individual nodes or networks links failed, message will spread through a different path

## **GOSSIP: IMPLEMENATION ATTEMPT**

for peer in self.peers:
 peer.send(msg)

def on\_receive(self, msg):
 for peer in self.peers:
 peer.send(msg)

**Problem:** Can create infinite loops

# **GOSSIP: IMPLEMENATION**

```
def create_message(self, content): de
    msg = {
        "uid": random(),
        "content": content,
    }
    # reuse code
    self.on_receive(msg)
```

```
def on_receive(self, msg):
    if msg["uid"] in self.known_messages:
        # ignore duplicates
        return
```

```
for peer in self.peers:
    peer.send(msg)
```

```
self.known_messages.insert(msg["uid"])
```

#### **More Possible Optimizations:**

- Don't send message back to the peer we received it from
- Only advertise a message, and send it if needed

# **GOSSIP IN BLOCKCHAINS**

```
# reuse code
self.on_receive(msg)
```

```
def on_receive(self, msg):
    if msg["uid"] in self.known_messages:
        # ignore duplicates
        return
```

```
if not is_valid(msg.content):
    # ignore invalid blocks/txns
    return
```

for peer in self.peers:
 peer.send(msg)

self.known\_messages.insert(msg["uid"])

# **GOSSIP IN BITCOIN**

## **Most Important Message Types**

inv ("Inventory"): Advertise new blocks/transactions to your peers

getdata: Request specific blocks/transactions from a peer

block or tx ("transaction"): Send the requested data

Full Bitcoin Protocol Specification: <u>https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol\_documentation</u>

# CONSENSUS

Make multiple nodes agree on the same thing, e.g., which transaction to accept.

## Why is this hard?


- Nodes can be faulty or malicious\*
- Network delays might drop or reorder messages

## Why is this even harder in the public blockchain setting?

- Large scale network
- (Usually) not all participants are known
- Nodes have different hardware and operating systems

\*malicious behavior is technically also a type of failure

# THE TWO (WISCONSIN) GENERALS' PROBLEM




**Enemy Camp** 

## Example to illustrate the challenges in achieving consensus

- Two generals have agreed to attack an enemy's camp
- The attack only succeeds if they attack at the same time
- They need to send a messenger through a snowstorm to agree on a time
  - There is a possibility the messenger dies in the storm and the message is lost

# THE TWO (WISCONSIN) GENERALS' PROBLEM




- To reach agreement, we need to know whether a message has arrived
- But the acknowledgement can also get lost

The problem, in this form, is unsolvable:

• We need *additional assumptions* about communication reliability to solve this

## THE BYZANTINE GENERALS PROBLEM



- Generals need to agree on whether or not to attack
- A malicious minority can cause the honest generals to adopt a bad decision

# **BREAK 1**

# NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS

Introduced with the Bitcoin paper in 2009
Named after the inventor's pseudonym

## A new class of consensus protocols

- First permissionless/public protocol
- Behaves in a probabilistic fashion
- Works well with large-scale networks

**Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System** 

Satoshi Nakamoto satoshin@gmx.com www.bitcoin.org

Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.


#### 1. Introduction

Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for non-reversible services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments

# **ASIDE: CONVENTIONAL CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS**

- Existing protocols are *deterministic* 
  - We know which blocks/transactions have been accepted with full certainty
- Existing protocols are permissioned/*private* 
  - All involved nodes are known
  - Adding or removing a node requires reconfiguration
- Most protocols, e.g., Paxos or PBFT, rely on a *leader* 
  - One node is elected and in charge of generating blocks
  - Detecting leader failure and electing a new leader is tricky

## **THE BLOCKCHAIN**



**Purpose 1:** Store transaction data and determine transaction ordering

**Purpose 2:** Track agreement on which transactions are accepted

# **GENESIS BLOCK**

There exists a single block as the "root" of every blockchain

• All chains/forks extend from here

Genesis block is part of the protocol definition


• Hard-coded into each implementation

## Bitcoin Genesis Block

#### Raw Hex Version

00000000	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000020	00	00	00	00	3B	A3	ED	FD	7A	7B	12	<b>B2</b>	7A	C7	2C	3E	;£íýz{.²zÇ,>
00000030	67	76	8F	61	7F	C8	1B	C3	88	8A	51	32	3A	9F	B8	AA	gv.a.È.Ā^ŠQ2:Ÿ,ª
00000040	4B	1E	5E	4A	29	AB	5F	49	FF	FF	00	1D	1D	AC	2B	7C	K.^J)«_Iÿÿ¬+
00000050	01	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000060	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000070	00	00	00	00	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	4D	04	FF	FF	00	1D	ÿÿÿÿM.ÿÿ
00000080	01	04	45	54	68	65	20	54	69	6D	65	73	20	30	33	2F	EThe Times 03/
00000090	4A	61	6E	2F	32	30	30	39	20	43	68	61	6E	63	65	6C	Jan/2009 Chancel
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00000110	8A	4C	70	2B	6B	F1	1D	5F	AC	00	00	00	00				ŠLp+kñ¬

# NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS: DEFINITION



**Component 1:** (Pseudo-)random Block Generation

- No pre-determined entity generates blocks, but virtually anyone can
- Multiple blocks can be created at the same time

## **Component 2:** Longest Chain Rule

- Correct nodes will always extend the longest chain when creating a new block
- When there are multiple longest chains, pick one at random


# **BYZANTINE FAILURES IN NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS**

Faulty nodes might

- Not extend the longest chain
- Send invalid blocks
- Create empty blocks
- Delay network messages

## What problems could this cause?

# **DOUBLE SPEND ATTACK**



## Goal

• When the network assumes a transaction is finalized, create some longer chain that reverts the transaction

# NAKAMOTO CONSENSUS: CONVERGENCE

**Assumption 1:** Synchronous network

- There exists some fixed time bound in which messages, e.g., blocks, will be delivered
- In Bitcoin the bound is usually assumed to be five minutes

**Assumption 2:** Faulty nodes control a minority of the mining power

• Honest nodes create more blocks on average

At some point it is *virtually impossible* for the faulty chain to overtake the honest chain

q=0.3	
z=0	P=1.0000000
z=5	P=0.1773523
z=10	P=0.0416605
z=15	P=0.0101008
z=20	P=0.0024804
z=25	P=0.0006132
z=30	P=0.0001522
z=35	P=0.0000379
z = 40	P=0.0000095
z = 45	P=0.0000024
z=50	P=0.000006

Solving for P less than 0.1%...

P < 0.001 q=0.10 z=5 q=0.15 z=8 q=0.20 z=11 q=0.25 z=15 q=0.30 z=24 q=0.35 z=41 q=0.40 z=89 q=0.45 z=340

#### "Figure" from the paper:

q is the mining power of the attacker z is the length of the "honest" chain

# **SYBIL RESISTANCE**

A malicious entity might try to configure many nodes to take over the network

- These are called *Sybils*
- We need some mechanism to detect or weaken Sybils

In permissioned/private protocols, the members (set of nodes) are predefined

• New nodes can only be added with a reconfiguration

In permissionless/public protocols, we need a dedicated Sybil-resistance mechanisms

• e.g., Proof-of-Work (today) or Proof-of-Stake (future lecture)


# **PROOF-OF-WORK**

Goal: Tie likelihood of generating a block to processing power


• Each node only has some finite amount of hardware

**Approach:** Create a very hard-to-solve task (the "crypto puzzle")

- Random tries are needed to find the solution
- We might need many attempts to solve it



# **PROOF-OF-WORK IN BITCOIN**



- Miners pick a random *nonce* value
- For a block to be valid, the block header's hash needs to be below some difficulty value
- Chance of mining a valid block at any point in time is *independent* of time already spent mining

## **POW: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT**

#### Annualized Total Bitcoin Footprints

Carbon Footprint	Electrical Energy	Electronic Waste			
50.83 Mt CO2	91.14 TWh	50.86 kt			
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Comparable to the carbon footprint of Hungary.	Comparable to the power consumption of Philippines.	Comparable to the small IT equipment waste of the Netherlands.			

#### Single Bitcoin Transaction Footprints

Carbon Footprint	Electrical Energy	Electronic Waste			
460.60 kgCO2	825.80 kWh	460.90 grams			
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Equivalent to the carbon footprint of 1,020,849 VISA transactions or 76,767 hours of watching Youtube.	Equivalent to the power consumption of an average U.S. household over 28.30 days.	Equivalent to the weight of <b>2.81</b> iPhones 12 or <b>0.94</b> iPads. (Find more info on e-waste <mark>here</mark> .)			

Source: <u>https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption</u>

# **BREAK 2**

# **DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT**

**Goal:** Ensure that a blocks are created at the same frequency


• e.g., every 10 Minutes in Bitcoin

**Challenge:** Mining power can change over time

- Miners can join or leave at any time
- Miners might start (or stop) mining if it is (not) economical to so
  - Depends on electricity, cryptocurrency, and hardware prices
- Miners can switch between networks (e.g., from Bitcoin to Dogecoin)


Adjust difficulty based on the *observed frequency vs. the expected frequency* 

# **DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS**



### **Period-Based**

- Every w blocks the difficulty will be adjusted
- For example, in Bitcoin every 2016 blocks (roughly 2 weeks) the difficulty is recalculated



## A B C D E G

### **Incrementally Extrapolated**

- Every block the difficulty will be adjusted slightly depending on how long it took to mine it
- Difficulty is only adjusted, not recalculated
- Used by Ethereum

### **Sliding Window**

- Every block the difficulty will be adjusted depending on how long it took to mine the last w blocks
- Used by Monero and Bitcoin Cash
- Different implementations have varying window sizes and mechanism to deal with outliers


# **ETHEREUM BLOCK GENERATION**

## "Information propagation in the Bitcoin network" (Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013)

- 95% of nodes can be reached in <13seconds
- 50% of nodes are reached within 6 seconds
- Numbers might be slightly different today

## Why does block propagation take so long?

- Nodes verify/execute blocks before forwarding
- Gossip network introduces additional network hops



# THAT'S ALL FOR TODAY

## Next time

- More Nakamoto Consensus
- Selfish Mining

**Reminder:** Project 2a due in a week