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Mr. R. Helms' briefing notes on Soviet defense spending and economic policy. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 28, 1967. Date Declassified: May 26, 1994. Unsanitized. Complete. 14 page(s).
B. You can see that investment in the other major programs used relatively small shares of the total 1967 budget: 1. The Moscow ABM system--radars, launchers, missiles: 100 million rubles, or $165 million. 2. The Tallinn long-range surface-to-air missile system, about 200 million rubles, or 4410 million. 3. Interceptor aircraft systems, 300 million rubles, or $720 million at our prices. 4. Ballistic missile submarines, 140 million rubles, or $340 million. C. Our prediction, then, is that the increased Soviet military spending in 1968 will not show up concentrated on any single mission or system. It will be spread over a number of programs, and will add to over-all Soviet military strength. V. The Soviet military leaders apparently made their case with the Politburo, not by arguing any one over-riding need, but because the political and economic climate was favorable to them. -5- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Mr. R. Helms' briefing notes on Soviet defense spending and economic policy. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 28, 1967. Date Declassified: May 26, 1994. Unsanitized. Complete. 14 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100063405
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