6
 7. If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
 the South shoul become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could
 draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
 of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
 greatly by Hanoi's concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a possible
 invasion., If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225,000 troops for
 the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base and for command
 and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops could be
 made available for use outside of North Vietnam.

C. Military Training and Leadership

8. Special preinfiltration training of North Vietnamese recruits has averaged
 about 3 months, although increasing numbers of prisoners report training of only
 I month prior to infiltration. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of properly
 trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and
 platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source of platoon
 leaders, the Infantry Officers' School near Son Tay, has reduced its 2-year
 course to 8 months. The bulk of the reserve officers and noncommissioned
 officers have been recalled to active duty. The largest single source of junior
 officers is now from battlefield commissions.

D. Infiltration

9. North Vietnam has the capability to train 75,000-100,000 men a year for
 infiltration. By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of
 units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could be substantially
 increased. Training replacements at the rate of 75,000-100,000 annually, however,
 would not permit organizing all of them into units and providing them with the
 necessary leadership at the same rate. Theoretically, North Vietnam could train
 and form 24-36 infantry regiments (48,000-72,000 men) per year, but at this pace
 there would be a considerable reduction in quality. In any case, actual formation
 and training of organized units for infiltration has been well short of this
 theoretical capability.

10. During 1966 at least 55,000 and possibly as many as 86,000 North Vietnamese
 troops were sent into South Vietnam (see Table 2). Through July 1966, the
 bulk of the infiltration was accounted for by the introduction of organized infantry
 regiments, including three regiments that moved directly across the DMZ. After
 July the pace of infiltration slackened somewhat, and it appeared that the Communist
 Regular force structure had reached planned levels. Most of the infiltration
 thereafter was to provide replacements in existing units.

11. During 1967, however, the introduction of organized units resumed--six
 regiments thus far--and the flow of individual replacements has continued. This
 mixture of units and individual replacements, plus the special situation along
 the DMZ, complicates an estimate of total infiltration. Not only is there the
 usual lag in identifying new units and infiltration groups, but there is less chance
 
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