8
 of capturing personnel or documents from each of the numerous small replacement
 groups. There is also the problem of the units that suffer casualties in the
 DMZ area and return to North Vietnamese territory for replacements; these
 latter cannot always be identified as new infiltrators when the units return to South
 Vietnamese territory. A similar problem applies to other border areas.

12. Infiltration thus far in 1967 totals about 35,000 in all categories (accepted
 and possible). Allowing for the probability that later information will raise
 these figures, and extrapolating, it now appears that total infiltration for 1967
 will be no more than last year's and possibly somewhat less. We estimate that
 some 65 to 75 percent of the infiltration will probably consist of replacement
 personnel for existing units. The remainder will probably include seven to nine
 organized regiments which will add to the Communist force structure but not
 necessarily their total military strength, because losses hae resulted in generally
 lower unit strengths. There still appears to be no clear-cut seasonal pattern in
 infiltration or any significant indication that Hanoi is unwilling to dispatch additional
 men and units to South Vietnam.

E. LOCs4

4 See centerspread map.

13. Supplies for Communist forces move into South Vietnam by various means.
 In North Vietnam, truck, rail, and water transport are used to bring supplies
 through Military Region 4 (MR-4). From MR-4, most supplies are trucked
 through Laos, although some use of waterways is also made in Laos. Some supplies
 move directly across the DMZ, and some are moved by sea. In addition,
 some supplies from Cambodia enter South Vietnam directly while others are
 routed through Laos.

14. Roads. The Communist logistical roadnet in MR-4 in North Vietnam
 and in Laos was improved over the past year. Though the improvements have
 increased tonnage capacities somewhat, they were intended primarily to provide
 additional flexibility for the system and better year-round movement. One
 development was the extension of a new motorable road from Laos directly
 into the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam. In addition, the administration and
 operational control of the LOCs have been improved and expanded. The capacity
 of the entire system for delivery of supplies to South Vietnam through
 Laos continues to be limited by the capacities of the routes in Laos rather than
 by those of North Vietnam.

15. Trucks. We estimate that at the end of 1965 the North Vietnamese had
 an inventory of between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks. Losses from air attack have
 been substantial, and North Vietnam has been forced to increase its imports
 to counter this attrition. Imports from Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China
 have enabled North Vietnam roughly to maintain the size of its inventory.

16. Maintenance problems have increased, and as many as 30 percent of the
 trucks may not be operable on a daily basis. There is a lack of well-equipped,
 
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