10
 Province have substantially increased their purchasese in Cambodia since March
 1956. The movement of supplies in Cambodia to Communist forces along the
 border, particularly on the Se San and Tonle Kond Rivers in the northeast and
 along kRoute 110 in Laos, has increased in the past year. Indications are that
 Communist units along the Cambodian border have been stockpiling some of
 the food and other materials obtained from Cambodia.

21. There is still no good evidence, however, that substantial amounts of
 weapons or ammunition are being obtained by the Communists from Cambodian
 stocks or through Cambodian ports. On the other hand, there is evidence that
 Communist units, particularly in the border area, receive arms and ammunition
 from stockpiles maintained on Cambodian territory. These munitions probably
 were moved south through Laos. Should infiltration of arms into South Vietnam
 through Laos be substantially reduced, Cambodia could be an alternative route
 for the Communists.

22. Sea Infiltration. We are unable to estimate the extent of the infiltration of
 supplies by sea into South Vietnam. We believe, however, that such infiltration
 has been greatly reduced by US counterefforts. Much of the Communists' use
 of sea routes, at present, is for the movement of supplies along the South Vietnamese
 coast. We believe that when a pressing need exists North Vietnam will
 increase attempts to move some supplies by sea, primarily arms and ammunition.

II. THE MILITARYSITUATION IN THE SOUTH

A. Communist Forces

23. For the purpose of this estimate, we consider the following elements of
 the Communist organization in South Vietnam: the Regular forces (NVA and
 VC Main and Local forces), the administrative service units which support them,
 the VC guerrilla forces, the political cadres, the self-defense forces, the secret
 self-defense forces, and the "Assault Youth." The contribution of these diverse
 elements to the Communist effort in South Vietnam differs widely in value.
 Their capabilities and missions are set forth in the following paragraphs.

24. We believe that, with the exception of the Regular forces, we have previously
 underestimated the strength of these elements. The figures carried in
 this estimate for these elements reflect new information and analysis rather than
 an increase in actual Communist strength. Furthermore, our information on
 the strength and organization of the different elements varies widely. For the
 Regular forces it is good; for other components it is much less reliable, less
 current, and less detailed. The resulting uncertainties are explained in the following
 paragraphs and are reflected by the use of ranges in the estimates we
 present.

25. Regular Forces. We are reasonably confident that the Communist rEgular
 forces in South Vietnam now total about 118,000 troops who are generally
 well-armed (see Table 3). This strength has fluctuated over the past 12 months,
 it is now somewhat less than it was at this time last year. During this period.
 
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 TS 186035
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