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(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s).
11 however, an increasing number of NVA replacements have been introduced into VC Main force units.
TABLE 3 ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF REGULAR COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM (As of 1 October 1967) Type Number Organization Regular NVA Forces 54,000 3 Front Headquarters' 7 Division Headquarters b c 26 Regiments (18 divisional and 8 separate) 106 Battalions (76 regimental and 30 separate) VC Main and Local Forces 64,000 d 2 Division Headquarters b 11 Regiments (7 divisional and 4 separate) 96 Battalions 934 regimental and 62 separate) 234 Separate Companies 54 Separate Platoons TOTAL 118,000
b A Front is a military organization designed to perform tactical and administrative functions and to control a number of units in a specific area. A Front is intentionally flexible, its military force composition changes as operational requirements dictate. Vietnamese Communist Fronts currently operating against South Vietnam are the B-3 Front, the DMZ Front, and the Northern Front or Subregion (now called the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region). (See map on page 17.)
b NAV/VC divisions in South Vietnam are considered as light infantry divisions tailored specificallyfor operation in South Vietnam. These divisions are highly foot-mobile and are fixible in force structure, organization, and strength. They normally are composed of three regiments (of about 1,500-2,000 per regiment) with varying technical and fire support elements. They lack wheeled transport and the type of artillery normally associated with NVA conventional divisions.
c In addition to the seven NVA divisions in South Vietnam, elements of the 341st division in North Vietnam have been committed from time to time to operations south of the DMZ under control of the DMZ Front.
d This total includes some NVA replacements; see paragraph 56.
26. Administrative Service Units. There is an extensive system for the administrative support of both NVA and VC Regular forces. It operates throughout South Vietnam and extends into Laos and Cambodia as well as the area immediately north of the DMZ. In South Vietnam it includes the military personnel in the staff and service elements (e.g., medics, ordnance, logistics, etc.) comprising the central, regional, provincial and district military headquarters, and in rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters. The need for administrative service forces, and hence their size, varies widely from province to province.
27. We cannot be confident of the total size of the administrative service forces at any given time. Information on the current strength of the administrative services at the various echelons is insufficient to establish a firm estimate. This force has almost certainly suffered attrition and has probably been drawn down to provide some combat replacements. Moreover, we do not estimate TOP SECRET 15 TOP SECRET TS 186035
(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100359393
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