14
 the size of the administrative service units located outside the boundaries of
 South Vietnam which support the forces in the DMZ and the western highlands.
 In light of these considerations, we estimate that there are now at least 35,000-40,000
 administrative service personnel in South Vietnam who are performing
 essential administrative support functions. In addition, almost anyone under
 VC control can be and is impressed into service to perform specific administrative
 or support tasks as local conditions require.

28. Guerrillas. The guerrillas provide an essential element of the VC combat
 capability. They are organized into squads and platoons which are not necessarily
 restricted to their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas
 are terrorist and sabotage activities, protection of villages and hamlets, provision
 of assistance to VC Main and Local force units as well as NVA, and the creation
 of local threats in order to divert allied forces to local security missions.

29. The guerrilla force has been subject to conflicting pressures. On the one
 hand, increasing numbers of guerrillas have been drawn upon to provide replacements
 for the VC Main and Local forces, because these have suffered heavy
 casualties as a result of more intense combat. At the same time, numerous
 captured documents as well as VC propaganda indicate a concern to increase
 the guerrilla force substantially. There is evidence which suggests that the
 leadership set very high force goals for the guerrillas but had, by mid-1966, fallen
 far short of its aims.

30. Information from captured documents leads us to believe that we have
 previously underestimated the guerrilla strength. Certain Communist documents
 which date from early 1966 assert that there were then about 170,000.
 180,000 guerrillas. This figure was almost certainly exaggerated. There is evidence
 which suggests that the Communists sometimes consider other groups
 part of the guerrilla force an therefore carry a larger number of guerrillas on
 their rolls. There is also considerable uncertainty over the accuracy of VC reporting
 at the lower levels. We believe that guerrilla strength has declined over
 the past year or so because of losses, upgrading of some personnel to Main and
 Local force units, and recruiting difficulties. We are unable to substantiate the
 extent to which the VC have been able to replace guerrilla losses. Considering
 all the available evidence and allowing for some uncertainties, we estimate that
 the current strength of the guerrilla force is 70,000-90,000.

31. The Political Organization. Presiding over the Communist effort is the
 political apparatus. This includes the leadership and administration of the
 National Liberation Front (NLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party (the
 name under which the North Vietnamese Communist Party operates in South
 Vietnam), both of which extend down to the hamlet level. The apparentus not
 only acts as a government in VC-controlled areas but also has major responsibilities
 for maintaining morale and for mobilizing manpower and other resources
 in support of the war effort. Its functions are not primarily military and it is
 therefore not included in the military order of battle. Nevertheless, it does
 represent a continuing potential for organizing and motivating the military
 forces Through this apparentus the Communists seek to control the people of
 
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 TS 186035
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