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(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s).
15 South Vietnam. It is, therefore, a key element which ultimately will have to be overcome along with the military and guerrilla forces. Its numbers are large--with a hard core estimated at about 75,000-85,000--but more important is the wide geographical extent of its power and the dedication and effectiveness of its personnel.
32. Other Communist Organizations. The Communists make a deliberate effort to organize most of the people under their control into various work forces and semimilitary organizations. Among the more significant of these organizations are the self-defense forces, secret self-defense forces, and groups such as the "Assault Youth." Moreover, when occasion demands, almost every ablebodied person under VC control may be called upon to support the war effort.
33. The self-defense force is described by the Communists as military organization. It is clear, however, that its organization and mission differ from that of village and hamlet guerrillas. Self-defense forces include people of all ages and a substantial percentage of them are females. They are largely unarmed and only partially trained. The duties of self-defense units include the maintenance of law and order, the construction of bunkers and strong points, warning against the approach of allied forces, and the defense of villages and hamlets in VC. controlled territory. Self-defense forces do not leave their home areas, and members generally perform their duties part-time. Their existence poses an impediment to allied sweeps and pacification, however, and in their defensive roke, they inflict casualties on allied forces.
34. Another element, the secret self-defense forces, operates in government-controlled and contested areas. They provide a residual Communist presence in such areas and support the Communist effort primarily by clandestine intelligence activities.
35. Durin the past year we have learned more about a VC orgnaization called "Assault Youth." They serve full time at district level and above, and they are organized into companies and platoons. Although some are armed, the Communists do not consider them a combat force; their primary mission appears to be logistical, frequently in battlefield areas. This organization also serves as a manpower pool and provides a training program for youth who later go into the VC main and Local forces. Little information is available to indicate the strength or distribution of the "Assault Youth."
36. Our current evidence does not enable us to estimate the present size of these groups (self-defense, secret self-defense, the "Assault Youth," or other similar VC organizations) with any meansure of confidence. Some documents suggest that in early 1966 the aggregate size of the self-defense force was on the order of 150,000. This force and to other groups, however, have unquestionably suffered substantial attrition since that time, as well as an appreciable decline in quality, because of losses, recruiting of some of their members into the guerrillas TOP SECRET 19 TOP SECRET TS 186035
(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100359397
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