16
 or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC
 control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still
 large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive
 military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total.
 Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist
 military losses.

37. In sum, the Communist militaryand political organization is complex, and
 its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover,
 anysuch aggregate total would be mislending since it would involve adding
 components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication.
 The VC/NVA Military Force (Main and Local forces, administrative service
 elements and guerrillas) can be meaningfully presented in numerical totals and,
 as indicated above, we estimate that this Military Force is now at least 223,000-248,000.
 It must be recognized, however, that this Military Force constitutes
 but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive
 judgment of Communist capabilitis in South Vietnam must embrace the effectiveness
 of all the elements which comprise that organization, the total size of which
 is of course considerably greater than the figure given for the Military Force.

B. The Command Structure

38. The Communists have continued to modify their command apparatus,
 and, in particular, Hanoi has significantly increased its direct control. This is
 most apparent in the DMZ and central highlands areas where Hanoi increasingly
 bypasses both COSVN and Military Region 5 (MR-5) Headquarters. With the
 exception of two VC divisions and one NVA division, all division headquarters
 and all the confirmed Fronts are in MR-5 or the DMZ area.6 In addition to the
 creatiop of the DMZ Front, which is controlled directly by Hanoi, it appears
 almost certain that MR-5 has been divided into three operational areas: The
 Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (formerly the Northern Front or Subregion), the
 B-3 or Western Highlands Front, and the remaining coastal provinces of the
 region.7 There is substantial evidence that Hanoi also exercises direct military
 control over the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and the B-3 Front.

6 The remainder of the command structure consists of provincial commands and of separate
 units, both directly subordinate to the respective VC military regions.

7 See map on opposite page for provinces included in these areas.

C. Logistical Support

39. During the past year captured documents and POW interrogations have
 provided a better basis for estimating how much of each class of supplies was
 needed and consumed by the Communist forces. Table 4 shows the estimated
 total daily Communist requirement in South Vietnam for Regular and Administrative
 Service Forces and that portion of it which comes from external sources.

40. About one-quarter of the daily requirement for both 1966 and 1967 was
 drawn from sources outside of South Vietnam. There is a growing dependence
 
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 TS 186035
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