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(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s).



16
or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC
control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still
large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive
military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total.
Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist
military losses.

37. In sum, the Communist militaryand political organization is complex, and
its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover,
anysuch aggregate total would be mislending since it would involve adding
components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication.
The VC/NVA Military Force (Main and Local forces, administrative service
elements and guerrillas) can be meaningfully presented in numerical totals and,
as indicated above, we estimate that this Military Force is now at least 223,000-248,000.
It must be recognized, however, that this Military Force constitutes
but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive
judgment of Communist capabilitis in South Vietnam must embrace the effectiveness
of all the elements which comprise that organization, the total size of which
is of course considerably greater than the figure given for the Military Force.

B. The Command Structure

38. The Communists have continued to modify their command apparatus,
and, in particular, Hanoi has significantly increased its direct control. This is
most apparent in the DMZ and central highlands areas where Hanoi increasingly
bypasses both COSVN and Military Region 5 (MR-5) Headquarters. With the
exception of two VC divisions and one NVA division, all division headquarters
and all the confirmed Fronts are in MR-5 or the DMZ area.6 In addition to the
creatiop of the DMZ Front, which is controlled directly by Hanoi, it appears
almost certain that MR-5 has been divided into three operational areas: The
Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (formerly the Northern Front or Subregion), the
B-3 or Western Highlands Front, and the remaining coastal provinces of the
region.7 There is substantial evidence that Hanoi also exercises direct military
control over the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and the B-3 Front.

6 The remainder of the command structure consists of provincial commands and of separate
units, both directly subordinate to the respective VC military regions.

7 See map on opposite page for provinces included in these areas.

C. Logistical Support

39. During the past year captured documents and POW interrogations have
provided a better basis for estimating how much of each class of supplies was
needed and consumed by the Communist forces. Table 4 shows the estimated
total daily Communist requirement in South Vietnam for Regular and Administrative
Service Forces and that portion of it which comes from external sources.

40. About one-quarter of the daily requirement for both 1966 and 1967 was
drawn from sources outside of South Vietnam. There is a growing dependence

TOP SECRET
20
TS 186035
TOP SECRET


(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.


Document Number: CK3100359398



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