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(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s).
16 or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total. Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist military losses.
37. In sum, the Communist militaryand political organization is complex, and its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover, anysuch aggregate total would be mislending since it would involve adding components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication. The VC/NVA Military Force (Main and Local forces, administrative service elements and guerrillas) can be meaningfully presented in numerical totals and, as indicated above, we estimate that this Military Force is now at least 223,000-248,000. It must be recognized, however, that this Military Force constitutes but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive judgment of Communist capabilitis in South Vietnam must embrace the effectiveness of all the elements which comprise that organization, the total size of which is of course considerably greater than the figure given for the Military Force.
B. The Command Structure
38. The Communists have continued to modify their command apparatus, and, in particular, Hanoi has significantly increased its direct control. This is most apparent in the DMZ and central highlands areas where Hanoi increasingly bypasses both COSVN and Military Region 5 (MR-5) Headquarters. With the exception of two VC divisions and one NVA division, all division headquarters and all the confirmed Fronts are in MR-5 or the DMZ area.6 In addition to the creatiop of the DMZ Front, which is controlled directly by Hanoi, it appears almost certain that MR-5 has been divided into three operational areas: The Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (formerly the Northern Front or Subregion), the B-3 or Western Highlands Front, and the remaining coastal provinces of the region.7 There is substantial evidence that Hanoi also exercises direct military control over the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and the B-3 Front.
6 The remainder of the command structure consists of provincial commands and of separate units, both directly subordinate to the respective VC military regions.
7 See map on opposite page for provinces included in these areas.
C. Logistical Support
39. During the past year captured documents and POW interrogations have provided a better basis for estimating how much of each class of supplies was needed and consumed by the Communist forces. Table 4 shows the estimated total daily Communist requirement in South Vietnam for Regular and Administrative Service Forces and that portion of it which comes from external sources.
40. About one-quarter of the daily requirement for both 1966 and 1967 was drawn from sources outside of South Vietnam. There is a growing dependence TOP SECRET 20 TS 186035 TOP SECRET
(Vietnam War) Bomb Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam through Fighting in South Vietnam (capabilities of North Vietnam: manpower and mobilization potential, armed forces, military training and leadership, infiltration, lines of communication. Military situation in the South: Communist political and military strength and organization, logistical support, morale, losses, and strategy). Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 14.3-67 and TS 186035. Nov. 13, 1967. 29 p., maps and tables. TOP SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Dec. 1, 1975. Estimate. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Nov 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Dec 01, 1975. Sanitized. Incomplete. 29 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100359398
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