1
 CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE
 COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN
 SOUTH VIETNAM1

1 This estimate supersedes NIE 14.3-66, "North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting
 in South Vietnam," dated 7 July 1966, TOP SECRET.

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists to conduct
 military operations in South Vietnam over the next year or so.2

2 The figures in this estimate are current as of 1 October 1967.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Our earlier understanding of overall Communist capabilities in
 Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely heavily on data provided by the
 GVN. Much of this turned out to be unreliable, and in many instances
 our numerical estimates of Communist forces, other than for the
 Regular units, were too low. Our information has improved substantially
 in the past year or two, but the unconventional nature of
 the war poses difficult intelligence problems, the more so in a social
 environment where basic data is incomplete and often untrustworthy.

Manpower, for example, is a key element for the Communists but
 we lack precise basic data on population size, rates of growth, and
 age distribution for both North and South Vietnam. Assessing Communist
 capabilities also involves an understanding of the organization
 and effectiveness of the various components in the Communist military
 and political apparatus in South Vietnam. Much of the evidence on
 these components is obtained from a variety of sources, including
 capitured documents, of varying reliability and timeliness. The analysis
 of this data, as well as that concerning North Vietnamese support
 to the South and all manpower questions requires complex methodological
 approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs.


 TOP SECRET
 TOP SECRET
 TS 186035