2
 Our data and conclusions are therefore subject to continuing review
 and revision, especially since capabilities do not remain static. In
 this estimate we have concentrated on reaching the best judgments
 of the current strength of the Communist forces and, because of
 incomplete and unreliable basic data, we have not attempted to reconstruct
 Communist strength retrospectively.

Reservations with respect to evidence are explained where approrpiate
 in the individual sections of the estimate. The main conclusions
 which follow, however, allow for such uncertainties in the supporting
 intelligence, represent our best appreciation of the overall situation
 as it now stands, and are based on the assumption that there is no
 radical change in the scale and nature of the war.

CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past year, Hanofs direct control and share of the
 burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This
 trend will continue.

B. Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists.
 Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is
 becoming more difficult. Despite heavy infiltration from North Vietnam,
 the strength of the Communist military forces and political
 organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year.

C. The major portion of this decline has probable been felt at
 the lower levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing these
 levels to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of
 the Regular military forces. In particular the guerrillas, now estimated
 to total some 70,000-90,000, have suffered a substantial reduction
 since the estimated peak of about early 1966. Regular force strength,
 now estimated at 118,000, has declined only slightly, but Viet Cong
 (VC) units are increasingly dependent upon North Vietnamese
 replacements.

D. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations,
 a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas
 are to be maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require
 both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967
 and intensive VC recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant
 factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the
 
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