4
 DISCUSSION

1. It has become increasingly obvious that Hanoirs share of the burden of
 war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. Infiltration of personnel in 1966.
 particularly into the northern provinces, was more than twice that of 1965.
 Hanoi's direct control of military and political operations has become more
 evident. The supply of weapons from the North has continued, and new
 weapons of greater firepower have been introduced. The logistical systems
 within North Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia have been expanded since
 1965 to provide a greater flexibility to cope with the effects of air interdiction,
 thereby enabling the Communists to meet higher levels of combat and support
 the growth of their forces to at least their present levels.

1. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM

A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential

2. The growing intensity of the war in the South and more than two years
 of US air strikes against the North have made manpower an increasingly important
 aspect in estimating Communist capabilities. Since mid-1965 the North
 Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded from an estimated 250,000 men to at
 least 470,000. This expansion includes those troops in Laos and South Vietnam.
 The bulk of the physically fit raft age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each
 year) is being taken into military service. The war in general and the bombing
 in particular have forced Hanoi to divert from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians (men
 and women, young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.

3. Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering insurmountable
 problems in obtaining sufficient able-bodied men to support the war
 in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnam's total population of over 18 million,
 about 4 million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half of these are
 probably physically fit for military service.3 At present, the North Vietnamese
 Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit males aged 15 to 49
 and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million fit males in the prime
 military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some evidence of lowering of draft
 standards and extending of age limits, it appears that, with a few local exceptions,
 Hanoi is still drafting only those between the ages of 17 and 35.

1 These figures are based on US Census Bureau estimates of North Vietnam's population,
 which do not accept entirely the figures of North Vietnam's 1960 census and subsequent
 demographic statistics published through 1963.

4. The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual increment
 of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces is substantial.
 The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where there are
 almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production is low. There
 are also about half a million men in the service sector of the economy, including
 
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 TS 186035
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