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Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s).
7. If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into the South should become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced greatly by Hanoi's concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a possible invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225,000 troops for the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base and for command and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops could be made available for use outside of North Vietnam. C. Military Training and Leadership 8. Special preinfiltration training of North Vietnamese recruits has averaged about 3 months, although incressing numbers of prisoners report training of only 1 month prior to infiltration. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of properly trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source of platoon leaders, the Infantry Officers' School near Son Tay, has reduced its 2-year course to 8 months. The bulk of the reserve -9- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205692
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