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Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s).
of the US bombing program. Although the mining of some North Vietnamese waterways has reduced the movement of large craft, small boat traffic continues. The increase in boat construction throughout North Vietnam and a program of waterway improvement indicate that the Communists intend to exploit further the potentialities of these water routes. In Laos, there has been increased use of small pirogues and motorboats on rivers over the last year. The use of these waterways will probably continue to increase. 18. Rail. The North Vietnamese also use the rail line south of Hanoi for movement of supplies into MR-4. Despite repested US air attacks, the North Vietnamese have been able to construct bypasses and keep sections of the line serviceable from Hanoi to Vinh. South of Vinh the rail line is not operable for regular rail equipment. The North Vietnamese can only use light gear, principally trucks with converted wheels, to transport supplies over the remaining rail segment in this area. 19. Impact of Air Attacks. Air attacks in North Vietnam, Laos, and the DMZ have destroyed trucks, railroad rolling stock, -17- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205700
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