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Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s).
CONCLUSIONS A. During the past year, Hanol's direct control and share of the burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This trend will continue. B. Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists. Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more difficult. Despite heavy infiltration from North Vietnam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at the lowest levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing this level to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of the Regular military forces. C. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations, a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas are to be maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967 and intensive Viet Cong (VC) recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the overall strength and -2- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205685
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