|
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s).
effectiveness of the military forces and the political infrastructure will continue to decline. D. The Communist leadership is already having problems in ??ining morale and quality. These problems have not yet impaired overall military effectiveness, but they are likely to become more difficult. 2. Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local shortages and interfere with Communist operations from time to time. But we believe that under existing conditions the Communists will be able to continue to meet the essential supply requirement for their forces in South Vietnam. F. Communist strategy is to sustain s protracted war of attrition and to persuade the US that it must pull out or settle on Banoi's terms. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year. Whether or not Hanoi does in fact persist with this strategy depends not only on its capabilities to do so, but on a number of political and international considerations not treated in this estimate. -3- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205686
Top of Page
DISCLAIMER: Best copy possible from original. Illegible text has been omitted.
Page numbers correlate to pages displayed, not original pagination.
|