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Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s).
DISCUSSION 1. It has become increasingly obvious that Hanoi's share of the burden of war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. Infiltration of personnel in 1966, particularly into the northern provinces, was more than twice that of 1965. Hanoi's direct control of military and political operations has become more evident. The supply of weapons from the north has continued, and new weapons of greater firepower have been introduced. The logistical systems within North Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodie have been expanded since 1965 and have been able to meet higher levels of combat and to support the growth in Communist forces.* I. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential 2. The growing intensity of the war in the South and more than two years of US air strikes against the North have made manpower an increasingly important aspect in estimating Communist capabilities. Since mid-1965 the North Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded from an estimated 250,000 men to at least 470,000. This expension includes those troops in Laos and South Vietnam. The bulk of the * The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, takes a dissent to the last sentence. -4- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for fighting in South Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Oct 21, 1967. Date Declassified: May 29, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 54 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205687
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