to through service have been on the rail connections
 in the immediate Hanoi area. The resulting
 delays in traffic have probably not been serious.

The North Vietnamese transport system has
 emerged from more than 30 months of bombing with
 greater capacity and flexibility than it had when
 the Rolling Thunder program started. The inventory
 of freight cars has been maintained and its
 carrying capacity increased; the number of trucks
 has also increased despite the high rate of
 destruction.

The successful countering of the interdiction
 program is explained by several factors. The
 density of the logistics target system in North
 Vietnam is so low and its diversity so great that
 it is extremely difficult to neutralize. Many of
 the more important elements of the system are
 also located in densely populated and heavily
 defended areas. In addition, the North Vietnamese
 have an effective system of countermeasures,
 abetted and strengthened by large infusions of
 labor, material, and equipment from their Communist
 allies. The extensive implementation of
 contingency programs has given the target system
 a redundancy and cushion that preempted the
 effects of some of our most successful strikes.
 Finally the neutralization of North Vietnam's
 modern industry and the virtual cessation of
 exports have relieved the transport network of
 about 10 percent of the traffic it carried in
 1966.

Although the air campaign destroys a large
 volume of supplies as they move southward, the
 requirements for supplies decrease further south
 and become extremely small at the end of the
 logistic funnel. It is clear that logistics
 problems have not placed a relevant ceiling on
 force structures or levels of combat.

Even a more intense interdiction campaign in
 the North would fail to reduce the flow of supplies
 sufficiently to restrict military operations.

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