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cost of using the Laotian corridor increased, they would not view it as a total
 solution to their problem, and would have to see additional alternatives.

25. Cambodia. Cambodia has been primarily a source of food, providing the
 bulk of the Communists external rice requirement, as well as some other items,
 such as medical supplies and radios. There is still no firm evidence that any
 substantial quantity of weapons or ammunition is being obtained by the Communists
 from or through Cambodia.

26. The capacity of Cambodian ports, roads, and waterways is far in excess
 of any likely Communist needs in South Vietnam. But the overt use of these
 facilities to ship arms and ammunition to the Communists in South Vietnam
 would clearly involve Cambodia in the war, something Sihanouk desperately
 wants to avoid. Nevertheless, given some time to make the necessary arrangement
 through additional use of commercial channels and clandestine means,
 the Communists could probably procure enough ammunition and weapons from
 or through Cambodia to make it an important alternate route.

27. Sources in South Vietnam. Communist forces operating in South Vietnam
 can obtain much of their logistical support locally, with the critical exception
 of arms and ammunition. For example, some 9 tons of their total daily requirement
 of 10 tons of ammunition is supplied from outside South Vietnam, most of it
 by truck through Laos. Although the VC might expand their modest production
 capability somewhat, it would be virtually impossible for them to develop the
 ability to produce the arms and ammunition needed by the Communist forces in
 South Vietnam.

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TS 0039350

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