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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s).


1

REACTIONS TO A CERTAIN
US COURSE OF ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Communist and Free World reactions to the
establishment of an anti-infiltration system in South Vietnam and Laos.

ASSUMPTION

This paper does not assess the degree of effectiveness of the antiinfiltration
system. It merely assumes, for the purpose of estimating
reactions, that the system will be sufficiently effective to require the
North Vietnamese to take countermeasures.

CONCLUSIONS

A. At its present level the Communist war effort in South Vietnam
is dependent on arms, ammunition and combat personnel moving from
North Vietnam through Loas and the DMZ. The Vietnamese Communists
would take direct and vigorous military countermeasures
against all elements of any system designed to impede this movement.
In such efforts they could count on technical and material assistance
from, the USSR and Communist China, but not on their active military
participation.

B. The Communists would probably harass the manned physical
barrier in South Vietnam intensively in order to tie down large US
forces in the area. They would make a major effort to keep truck
traffic moving along the roadnet and men along the trails. In particular,
they would recognize the key role of air operations in installing
and monitoring the airdropped; portions of the system as well as in
making air strikes. Therefore they would move to increase their air
defenses in the DMZ area and in Laos.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TS 0039350
COPY LBJ LIBRARY


Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.


Document Number: CK3100574290



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