2

C. Should their countermeasures be ineffective or too costly, the
 Communists would be forced to attempt to extend their operations
 further west into Laos or resort to alternative routes. All of these
 measures would impose additional burdens on the Communists, but
 on balance, the US move in itself would probably not cause Hanoi
 to change its political and military strategy toward the conduct of
 the war in South Vietnam.

D. The intensity and nature of the Communist political response
 would depend on the effectiveness of the system and the publicity
 which accompanied its emplacement. Aside from propaganda charging
 the US with widening the war in Laos, the main Communist effort
 would be directed at the Laotian Government. The Communists
 would probably exert pressures on Souvanna to prevent any further
 US activities in Laos. It is unlikely that the Soviets would denounce
 the Geneva Agreements, demand on-site inspection, or withdraw as
 co-Chairman.

E. US relations with non-Communist countries, with the possible
 exception of Laos, are unlikely to be changed by the emplacement of
 the system. Some countries would see it as escalation, others as a
 defensive move. The hope would be expressed that the bombing of
 North Vietnam would no longer be necessary, and that a process of deescalation,
 even negotiations, might begin. Souvanna, despite concern
 that Laos not become actively engaged in the war, would probably not
 oppose the installation of the system.

TS 0039350

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