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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s).


3

DISCUSSION

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The Laotian corridor is the primary route for infiltration of personnel,
ammunition, weapons, and equipment to Communist forces in South Vietnam.
It contains a road network for supplies and a network of trails for personnel.¹
The entire system is controlled by the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense
in Hanoi. The NVA 559th Transportation Group, currently based north of
Tohepone in Laos, operates the logistic network and supplies the storage depots
used by troops moving through the Laotian corridor. In mid-1966 the North
Vietnamese also began to move military units and their supplies directly across
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into Quang Tri Province.

2. The Anti-Infiltration System. The proposed anti-infiltration system is designed
to impede movement through Laos and the DMZ into South Vietnam.
The system would extend from the eastern coast along the northern border of
South Vietnam and into Laos. It would have three parts: in the east, a 20-mile
wire and minefield barrier defended by ground troops; in the center, an airdropped
antipersonnel system composed of mines and sensors, extending some
25 miles across the rest of South Vietnam and some 12 miles or so further into
Laos; and in the west, an airdropped antivehicular system also composed of
mines and sensors, straddling the truck routes from 15 to 40 miles inside Laos.²
It is presently planned that the airdropped portions of the system would be
emplaced during an eight day period in early November 1967; the physical

¹See the frontispiece map for the Communist roadnet and the foot trails. Infiltrating
personnel are not trucked over the roadnet; they walk over the trail system, usually in elements
of company size, starting from Hill 1001 in North Vietnam (just above the northwest
corner of the DMZ). Within North Vietnam they either walk or are trucked to the vicinity
of Hill 1001, where they undergo final preparations for infiltration.

²See the centerspread map for a diagram of where the proposed anti-infiltration system
would be emplaced. The airdropped portions of the system consist of a complex combination
of mines and sensors. The mines to be used in the antivehicular sector are designed to
damage trucks as well as to inhibit clearing of the sensors which would be emplaced near
the roads. In the antipersonnel sector several types of mines are employed to prevent infiltrators
from walking through the fields and woods and restrict them to fixed trails. In addition,
small "button bomblets" would be scattered along the trails. These are designed not to
injure but to make a sufficient noise when stepped on to activate the acoustic sensors, which
would be dropped by parachute and are designed to hang in trees near the trails. Seismic
sensors would be dropped without a parachute, in order to bury themselves in the ground.
Other types of sensors, e.g., infrared and magnetic, would be implanted along the trails by
special teams. All of the sensors contain radio transmitters, and when activated, their transmissions
would be picked up by EC-121 aircraft which would monitor the system on a
24-hour basis, circling near the inflitration area. These aircraft would relay the signals to
the project control center which would evaluate the sesings and call in strike aircraft. Frequent
replacement of mines and sensors would be necessary because of their short life, and
because many would be destroyed by the air strikes, or enemy action. Tentative plans are
for the headquarters of the Infiltration Surveillance Center, and the bases for the EC-121's and
some other aircraft, to be in Thailand. Other components would be based in South Vietnam.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TS 0039350
COPY LBJ LIBRARY


Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.


Document Number: CK3100574292



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