|
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s).
3
DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The Laotian corridor is the primary route for infiltration of personnel, ammunition, weapons, and equipment to Communist forces in South Vietnam. It contains a road network for supplies and a network of trails for personnel.¹ The entire system is controlled by the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense in Hanoi. The NVA 559th Transportation Group, currently based north of Tohepone in Laos, operates the logistic network and supplies the storage depots used by troops moving through the Laotian corridor. In mid-1966 the North Vietnamese also began to move military units and their supplies directly across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into Quang Tri Province.
2. The Anti-Infiltration System. The proposed anti-infiltration system is designed to impede movement through Laos and the DMZ into South Vietnam. The system would extend from the eastern coast along the northern border of South Vietnam and into Laos. It would have three parts: in the east, a 20-mile wire and minefield barrier defended by ground troops; in the center, an airdropped antipersonnel system composed of mines and sensors, extending some 25 miles across the rest of South Vietnam and some 12 miles or so further into Laos; and in the west, an airdropped antivehicular system also composed of mines and sensors, straddling the truck routes from 15 to 40 miles inside Laos.² It is presently planned that the airdropped portions of the system would be emplaced during an eight day period in early November 1967; the physical
¹See the frontispiece map for the Communist roadnet and the foot trails. Infiltrating personnel are not trucked over the roadnet; they walk over the trail system, usually in elements of company size, starting from Hill 1001 in North Vietnam (just above the northwest corner of the DMZ). Within North Vietnam they either walk or are trucked to the vicinity of Hill 1001, where they undergo final preparations for infiltration.
²See the centerspread map for a diagram of where the proposed anti-infiltration system would be emplaced. The airdropped portions of the system consist of a complex combination of mines and sensors. The mines to be used in the antivehicular sector are designed to damage trucks as well as to inhibit clearing of the sensors which would be emplaced near the roads. In the antipersonnel sector several types of mines are employed to prevent infiltrators from walking through the fields and woods and restrict them to fixed trails. In addition, small "button bomblets" would be scattered along the trails. These are designed not to injure but to make a sufficient noise when stepped on to activate the acoustic sensors, which would be dropped by parachute and are designed to hang in trees near the trails. Seismic sensors would be dropped without a parachute, in order to bury themselves in the ground. Other types of sensors, e.g., infrared and magnetic, would be implanted along the trails by special teams. All of the sensors contain radio transmitters, and when activated, their transmissions would be picked up by EC-121 aircraft which would monitor the system on a 24-hour basis, circling near the inflitration area. These aircraft would relay the signals to the project control center which would evaluate the sesings and call in strike aircraft. Frequent replacement of mines and sensors would be necessary because of their short life, and because many would be destroyed by the air strikes, or enemy action. Tentative plans are for the headquarters of the Infiltration Surveillance Center, and the bases for the EC-121's and some other aircraft, to be in Thailand. Other components would be based in South Vietnam.
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TS 0039350 COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100574292
Top of Page
DISCLAIMER: Best copy possible from original. Illegible text has been omitted.
Page numbers correlate to pages displayed, not original pagination.
|