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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s).
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barrier an enlargement of the "Ky barrier" now being built would be completed at that time. The central and western sections of the system would rely on air strikes to attack the targets. Small teams, including some Americans, would be involved in emplacing certain types of sensors in Laos.
II. POLITICAL REACTIONS
A. Communist Attitudes
3. Although the US action would not come as a surprise to the Communists, they would criticize the US for widening the war in Laos, killing innocent people, and violating the Geneva Accords; these things they could do without referring to North Vietnam's own activities in the area. Hanoi, however, would have some reasons to limit its reactions since it has never admitted publicly to the presence of any of its forces in South Vietnam or Laos. Hanoi might also be concerned that the US action would lead to the introduction of Allied ground troops into the Laotian corridor. The Communists therefore probably would seek to put pressure on the Laotian Government and to play on Souvanna's fears of a wider war.
4. The intensity and nature of the Communist response would depend in considerable part on the effectiveness of the anti-infiltration system and the publicity which accompanied its emplacement. If it proved to be ineffective, there would be little or no reaction, particularly from Hanoi. If the system were effective, Communist pressures on Laos would be more severe, and the attempt to condemn the US before international opinion would be more vociferous. We think the Communists would also try to obtain some advantage from the situation by renewing arguments that US bombing of North Vietnam should be stopped. On balance, we believe the US move in itself would probably not cause Hanoi to change its political and military strategy toward the conduct of the war in South Vietnam.
5. Peking would be noisier than Hanoi in its propaganda. The Chinese might send technical advisors to assist the North Vietnamese in work against the system in Laos. We doubt that they would send any large number of Chinese personnel into Laos or North Vietnam. If the system proved to be effective, Peking would probably attempt to help expand supply channels through Cambodia as an alternative system, making use of the Chinese population and other assets there. The reaction of the Soviets would be influenced by their role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements. They would exert pressures on Souvanna, but it is unlikely they would denounce the Geneva Agreements, demand on-site inspection, or withdraw as co-Chairman. Moscow might also reemphasize its argument that the US should give up the bombing of North Vietnam.
B. Non-Communist Attitudes
6. Non-Communist reactions would be mixed but would generally follow along established lines. They would also be determined by the degree of
TS 0039350
TOP SECRET TS 0039350 TOP SECRET COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 10-1-67 entitled: "Reactions to a Certain U.S. Course of Action." This document assesses probable Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system designed to impede t"Reactions to a Certain US Course of Action". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jul 13, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 06, 2005. Complete. 17 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100574293
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