5

publicity concerning the system and, in the long run, by its effectiveness. Some
 non-Communist governments would see the action as escalatory and criticize
 the US with such terms as "Berlin Wall." Others would see the system as essentially
 defensive and would hope, particularly if the system proved to be effective,
 that the US would stop the bombing of North Vietnam and that a process
 of de-escalation, even negotiations, might begin. Except in the possible case of
 Laos, which we discuss below, we do not believe that the reactions would be
 likely to change US relations with any country in any significant way. The
 Thai would accept the installations required for the airborne aspects of the
 system but would expect to be compensated for the additional burdens imposed
 on them. Sihanouk might interpret the US move as evidence of increased determination
 to isolate VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam and he would probably
 fear that the next US move would be against Communist forces enjoying sanctuary
 in Cambodia. He would fear new Communist pressures for greater use of
 Cambodia and would be concerned that smuggling from and through Cambodia
 to the Communists would increase in any event, thus embroiling Cambodia
 deeper in the war.

7. The Laotian Government would be directly affected and Souvanna would
 have various fears and reservations about the action. He would be most concerned
 that there be no publicity and certainly no acknowledgment from any
 official US source, of US operations in Laos. This would permit him to deny
 responsibility for any incidents and to maintain his posture under the Geneva
 Agreements of 1962.

8. Souvanna might fear that if the manned physical barrier in South Vietnam
 turned out to be the most effective part of the entire system, pressures would
 mount to extend it across Laos, with supporting ground troops. He would
 probably oppose this in the belief that it would involve Loas in a wider war
 and would revive the traditional separatism in the southern part of the panhandle.
 Further, Souvanna, would be concerned that if the system as a whole proved
 effective, the Communists would attempt to go around it to the west and possibly
 increase military pressures elsewhere in Laos. Despite these concerns, and given
 assurances of no public acknowledgment, we believe Souvanna would not oppose
 the installation of the system.

III. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES

A. General

9. During the past several years North Vietnamese movement of material
 through the Lao corridor appears to have exceeded the external requirements
 for Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, and some stockpiling has
 occurred. During the construction and installation of the barrier portion of the
 system, we would expect efforts to increase such stockpiling.

10. Once the remainder of the anti-infiltration system was emplaced, the North
 Vietnamese, of course, would have to determine how it worked. They might
 be somewhat surprised at its extent and form. They are already familiar, how-

TOP SECRET
 TOP SECRET
 TS 0039350
 COPY LBJ LIBRARY