bombing on the logistics funnel. And the Soviets might
 also conclude that the chances that the US would persist
 in a long ground war in South Vietnam had actually improved
 if the criticism of the bombing program receded.
 17. These attitudes of both the USSR and China are
 in the context of an adjustment of bombing policy, without
 reference to any other US moves. If, for example, the US
 also increased its troop strength, this might dispel some
 of the misapprehension over US resolve. Or, if the US
 undertook some political initiatives to exploit the new
 bombing policy, this might influence the Communist response.
 Whether or not Hanoi responded to these initiatives would
 depend on its view of the military outlook in the South,
 and on whether it believed that a move toward negotiation
 would bring success nearer. China, of course, would continue
 to oppose any movement in this direction. But if Hanoi did
 decide to explore the possibilities for an end to the bombing
 followed by negotiations, then the USSR would almost certainly
 become more active in assisting the development of a negotiating
 situation.
 -9-
 
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