assumed to include attacks on lines of communications in
 the Northwest.
 19. Alternative II apparently diminishes the
 interdiction effort against the logistics target system
 in Route Packages I, II, and III. If this is so, it would
 be counter-productive in terms of reducing the capacity
 and increasing the difficulty of moving men and materiel
 to the South. Taken literally, this Alternative has two
 other deficiencies. First, it omits attacks against the
 Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line, and the parallel road systems
 in the Northwest (Route Package V). Second, it would
 preclude restrikes against military and industrial fixed
 targets other than airfields.
 20. North Vietnam now has the capacity to move about
 14,000 ??ons of goods a day on its major jail, sea road and
 inland water import routes. It has been estimated previously
 that an optimum program against all means of land and water
 transportation could at most reduce North Vietnam's transport
 capacity to import from 14,000 tons a day at present to
 about 3,900 tons. Interdiction to this extent would reduce
 the present level of goods imported by about 25 percent,
 since North Vietnam presently imports an average of 5,300
 tons of goods daily. If imports were kept to manageable
 -11-
 
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