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Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s).
levels by aliminating all but essential military and economic goods, daily imports would average about 3,000 tons a day. This amount of traffic could be handled even if the daily capacity of North vietnam's transport system were reduced to 3,900 tons. 21. Imports at this level would not be sufficient to continue operations of modern industrial plants or to restore operation of those which have received extensive bomb damage. The economy would be reduced to its essential subsistence character, but those modern sectors such as transportation, construction, communications, and other elements essential to support the military establishment in North Vietnam and in the South could be sustained. Losses of US Pilots and Aircraft 22. Alternative II, particularly in the variant calling for attacks on port facilities and other targets in the Haiphone area, would be the most costly in terms of losses of US pilots and aircraft. A total of 28 aircraft or 35 percent of the total were lost in combat during attacks against targets located in Route Package VI during January-April 1967. The extension of the Rolling Thunder program to attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area has resulted in an extremely high loss rate. During -12- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205675
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