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Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s).
January-April 1967, the US air forces operating over all of North Vietnam experienced a loss rate of 0.33 percent. During the period 20 April-14 May 1967, the forces attacking targets in the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area had a loss rate of 3.6 percent. 23. In addition, the concentration of attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong area will result in a sharp decline in the recovery of downed pilots because of the heavy defenses and greater population in the area. Although statistics on recovery of downed pilots by Route Package area are not available, the recovery rate has declined markedly as the air campaign extended into the Hanoi-Haiphong area. During ?? the recovery rate was 40 percent. During the ?? four months of 1967 the recovery rate declined to 28 percent. Soviet and Chinese Responses 24. The first variant of Alternative II would not necessarily be perceived by the Communists as a change in US bombing policy. While it would become apparent that the US was avoiding certain fixed targets and the Hanoi and Haiphong vicinities, Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow would probably read the attacks on all the airfields as an intensification of the air war. -13- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205676
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