likely that the main Soviet response would be to continue
 supplying Hanoi, transportation arrangements with China
 permitting, and to put maximum political pressures on the
 US. Moscow would try to mobilize world opinion on the
 issue of blocking free passage of all shipping, and,
 depending on Hanoi's attitude would consider taking the
 matter to the UN. In addition, it would be likely to take
 other diplomatic actions which would demonstrate the damage
 to US-Soviet relations across the board.
 30. Nevertheless, as the crisis intensified, there
 is a good chance the USSR would make a stronger effort
 toward a political solution, urging the course of negotiations
 more vigorously than they have heretofore. But they probably
 would still not be willing to make Hanoi's acceptance of talks
 an explicit condition of continued material support.
 31. The interdiction of North Vietnamese ports would
 not in itself compel the Chinese to undertake new military
 actions. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would enter
 the war at this point. It is likely, however, that the Chinese
 commitment to support Vietnam would be strengthened. If
 requested, the Chinese might introduce some combat troops in
 North Vietnam. The net result of this program would be to
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