The Flow of Men and Materiel
 2. Alternative I cannot be expected to reduce the
 flow of men and materiel to the South below present levels.
 It would undoubtedly increase the costs of maintaining the
 logistic system and would degrade its capacity somewhat
 further. This judgment is based on the results of the
 Rolling Thunder program to date and on the nature of the
 logistic target system.
 3. During the period January 1966-April 1967, the
 logistics target system included in Route Packages I, II,
 and III has received about 70 percent of the attack sorties
 flown in the Rolling Thunder program. Despite the intensity
 of the attack, the North Vietnamese now have a greater
 capacity to move men and supplies than they did when the
 bombing started.
 4. We estimate, based on performance to date, that
 the actual movement of supplies from North Vietnam into
 Laos and South Vietnam during the 1966-167 dry season
 will be greater than it was during the 1965-1966 dry season.
 The volume of supplies moved by trucks through the Mu Gia
 Pass route alone will exceed that moved last season. In
 addition, the North Vietnamese are moving supplies along
 Routes 137/912. There is no roadwatch reporting on this
 -2-
 
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