movement, but if the route is being used to the same
 proportion of its capacity as the Mu Gia route, the volume
 of supplies available for stockpiling in Laos or for
 movement to South Vietnam during the current dry season
 could be as much as 15,000 tons or about four times greater
 than the amounts to South Vietnam through Laos 1965-1966
 dry season.
 5. The expected effects from the interdiction
 campaign are more evident when actual traffic is compared
 to route capacity. During the 1965-1966 dry season, truck
 traffic on Route 15 through Mu Gia Pass averaged 28 trucks
 daily or about 85 tons of supplies a day. At this level
 of traffic the route was being used to less than 20 percent
 of its capacity of 450 tons a day. Since the 1965-1966 dry
 season the capacity of Route 15 has been increased to about
 740 tons a day. Traffic during the current and longer dry
 season averaged 23 trucks a day or about 70 tons of supplies.
 This level of traffic is less than 10 percent of the current
 capacity of Route 15.
 6. The ability of North Vietnam to maintain and improve
 its logistic network is impressive. During 1966 some 340
 miles of alternative routes were built in Military Region IV*
 * Military Region IV accords roughly with Route Packages I
 and II.
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 COPY LBJ LIBRARY