workers engaged in repair, reconstruction, dispersal, and
 transport programs. An unknown but significant share of
 these workers could be relocated as the bombing program
 proposed in Alternative I would lessen the manpower requirement
 in other areas of North Vietnam.
 10. North Vietnam presently uses an estimated 2,000
 trucks to handle the entire logistic effort based in Military
 Region IV--for the forces around DMZ, the forces in Northern
 Laos, the forces in the Panhandle of Laos, and the forces in
 South Vietnam. Less than 400 trucks are used to move supplies
 in Laos to the border ?? south ??etnam. Even if the
 interdiction program were to double the rate at which
 vehicles are destroyed or damaged, these losses could be
 replaced from the existing inventory of trucks, estimated
 at 12,000-13,000 vehicles, or by increased imports from
 Communist countries. During the past 16 months imports of
 trucks totaled at least 4,400 vehicles and estimated losses
 to air attack were about 3,400. Thus the truck inventory
 increased by about 1,000 vehicles during the per??.
 11. In summary, the excess capacity on the road networks
 in Route Packages I, II, and III provides such a deep cushion
 that it is almost certain that no interdiction program can
 ??eutralize the logistics target system to the extent necessary
 to reduce the flow of men and supplies to South Vietnam below
 their present levels.
 
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