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Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s).
Losses of US Pilots and Aircraft 12. The concentration of bombing in Route Packages I, II, and III, as outlined in Alternative I, would, in the short term, be less costly in terms of losses of US pilots and aircraft. This is apparent in the statistics for combat losses of aircraft during the first four months of 1967. A total of 80 US aircraft were lost during this period. Only 18 aircraft, or 22 percent of the total, were lost in combat over Route Packages I, II, and III, although about 70 percent of all attack sorties were flown over this area. 13. When it becomes apparent to the North Vietnamese that the bombing is being concentrated in Route Packages I, II, and III and that a virtual sanctuary exists in most other parts of the country, they can be expected to increase their air defenses and to move more SAMs into the region. A greater defense would increase US aircraft losses although this area probably would never be as heavily defended as Route Packages VIa and VIb. Soviet and Chinese Responses 14. Alternative I would substantially reduce the chances of increased military or political pressures on the US from both China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese would attribute -7- TOP SECRET TOP SECRET COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Evaluation of alternative programs for bombing North Vietnam. Miscellaneous. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Jun 1, 1967. Date Declassified: Jun 05, 1985. Unsanitized. Complete. 18 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100205670
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