such a change in US policy primarily to a lack of will in
 the face of rising domestic and international criticism and
 to a general frustration in the US over its inability to
 bring the war to a successful conclusion. The Chinese,
 therefore, would almost certainly advise Hanoi that, having
 scored an important gain, the North Vietnamese had even
 greater incentive to persist in their current strategy of
 protracted war.
 15. At the same time, neither Hanoi nor Peking could
 be certain that the US would maintain restrictions on the
 bombing. There would be a continuing expectation that the
 US would resume attacks north of the 20th par??
 as reconstruction of important installations made visible
 progress. There would also be some suspicion, particularly
 in Peking, that the US had taken the move to prepare the
 groundwork for a diplomatic effort to persuade Hanoi to
 make peace.
 16. Moscow would be relieved that the US had broken
 the cycle of escalation. The Soviets, too, would be inclined
 to construe the US move as a concession to pressures at home
 and abroad. They would probably also recognize, however,
 that the US might have valid military reasons for concentrating
 -8-
 
 TOP SECRET
 TOP SECRET
 COPY LBJ LIBRARY