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CIA reports on Communist China's Army and Provincial Party politics. Report. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Apr 25, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 16, 1979. Sanitized. Complete. 68 page(s).
of the month Tao had appeared firmly established as number four man in the post-August hierarchy. When he moved to the center Tao had retained his power base in the Central South Bureau where he had for years been first secretary. He subsequently attempted to enlarge it by acquiring supporters among party leaders in East China, where the regional bureau had been without a designated head for nearly two years and had probably been managed by Teng Hsiao-ping before his downfall. Posters appearing in late November charged Tao with protecting several party bosses in the provinces, including Li Pao-hua--third secretary in the East China Bureau and party chief in Anhwei Province. Tao would thus have had an interest in blocking a drive to eliminate power centers outside Peking. His sudden and unexpected denunciation at the end of December may indicate that he joined the military and party opposition in desperation when the issue came to a head. The Army Reacts to the Purge 21. It was clear that bringing down Ho Lung and his fellow conspirators did not mark the end of the matter so far as the military establishment was concerned. Even the newly reorganized armed forces' purge machinery was not regarded as reliable by its creators. Within a few days after the reorganization, two members--both editors of Liberation Army Journal--had been removed. Instead of stimulating new enthusiasm for the "revolution," the move to strengthen the military purge apparatus, together with attacks on major military figures, may actually have operated to heighten fears regarding their future position among senior troop commanders--generals of armies and high-ranking staff officers in the military regions--and inclined them to hang back. 22. Many of these men had former ties of one sort or another with military leaders who had come under attack, and even those with no connections which then appeared to be potentially dangerous must have been fearful of what a further enlargement of the "revolution" might bring in the way of ex post facto charges later on. Up to Mid-January local political leaders had been successfully resisting in virtually every province, and commanders in almost every military region must have -11- TOP SECRET No Foreign ?? No Foreign ?? TOP SECRET COPY Lyndon Baines Jonson Library
CIA reports on Communist China's Army and Provincial Party politics. Report. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Apr 25, 1967. Date Declassified: Apr 16, 1979. Sanitized. Complete. 68 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100168865
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