foreseen the possibility that they might be held responsible
 for this following a Maoist triumph even if they
 had been acting all along on the basis of orders from
 their superiors.
 23. Apprehensions of this sort could be expected
 to reinforce the fundamental lack of sympathy for the
 Cultural Revolution which was probably widespread among
 officers of field grade or higher. We have no firm
 evidence on which to base an assessment of the state of
 mind within the officer corps of the PLA, but military
 establishments tend to be conservative and it
 seems reasonable to suppose that by this time the professional
 soldiers who formed its backbone had seen
 more than enough revolutionary disorder and would be
 receptive to proposals which would bring it to a halt.
 The PLA Faces a Choice
 24. The problem probably come to a head for the
 military around the third week in January. A directive
 was issued on 23 January ordering the army to take an
 active role in backing pro-Mao forces. They earlier
 practice of "standing on the sidelines" in the struggle
 was condemned and all orders to this effect were countermanded.
 A major editorial printed in People's Daily
 the day before puts this directive into perspective. It
 admitted that Mao had recently suffered a "serious setback"
 and spoke gloomily of the possibility of increasing
 violence and "zigzags and ups and downs" before
 victory could be achieved. The tone was violent, almost
 hysterical, and the prescription given for Maoist success
 was to "seize power! power!! and more power!!!" The
 editorial asserted flatly that "he who is without power
 is nothing. Of all the important things, the possession
 of power is the most important!"
 25. Assertions that troops were being used in
 force to subdue Mao's opponents in the provinces appeared
 in Peking broadcasts immediately following
 issuance of the new directive. Claims of successful
 take-overs by Maoists, however, indicated that in fact
 widespread resistance was continuing and that the armed
 forces did not move as one man to follow the new instructions.
 In some areas the response was prompt,
 but in others resistance and confusion persisted for
 -12-
 
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