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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

10 August 1981

RAMIFICATIONS OF PLANNED US NAVAL EXERCISE IN THE
 GULF OF SIDRA. 10-20 AUGUST 1981 (S NF)

This assessment was prepared at the request of
 the Director of Central Intelligence under the
 suspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
 Near East and South Asia. Contributions were provided
 by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
 Department of State; the Defense Intelligence
 Agency; the National Security Agency; and the
 intelligence organizations of the Army, Air Force,
 Navy, and Marine Corps. It has been coordinated
 at the working level. (C)

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

-- The Libyan Government is likely to view the exercise as
 a conspiracy directed against it. The possibility of a
 hostile tactical reaction resulting in a skirmish is real.
 Even without such a skirmish, the Libyan Government may
 view the penetration of its claimed waters and airspace
 as "an incident."

-- There are several nonmilitary reaction options open to
 Tripoli, notably a petroleum boycott, nationalizations
 of petroleum facilities, and harassment of US nationals.
 The first two would be limited in effectiveness and
 unlikely under most scenarios. The third is more probable.

-- Libya's adoption of a clandestine terrorist reprisal
 policy is also possible.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 NLS F97-073 # 212
 By LOJ, NARA, Date 2/23/01