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Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s).


TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

should Libya decide to take hostile action against US
units, it has several options available:

-- First, Libyan fighters could attempt to intercept
US aircraft. In this regard. Syrian pilots
operating from Benina are probably more likely
to initiate an air-to-air engagement than Libyan
pilots.

-- Second, Libya could attempt a strike against US
surface unites with fighter aircraft using AS-9
antiradition missiles. Libyan pilots have not
been noted training for antiship attacks in
recent years, and their proficiency in this role
is probably low.

-- Third, Libya could order one of its F-Class diesel
attack submarines to attack a US ship. Although
US antisubmarine warfare assets are likely to have
Libyan submarines under surveillance, a torpedo
attack could take place without warning.

Even if a premeditated decision to engage US forced is
not made, the possibility of a hostile incident through miscalculation
exists and will increase during the exercise.
Libya will probably launch a large number of fighters, and
a number of naval unites will probably attempt to monitor the
exercise. The scope of these likely reactions may cause
command and control problems for Libyan authorities, increasing
the possibility that an order might be misunderstood or
that an overeager crew might exceed its authority. (S)

Nonmilitary Options

Petroleum Embargo. Potential Libyan economic reprisals
could take the form of an oil embargo against the United
States and those West European countries that service 6th

4

TOP SECRET UMBRA


Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.


Document Number: CK3100536828



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