Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s).
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hand could be plausibly denied. Links to certain radical Palestinian groups would make them the obvious vehicles for such Libyan retaliation, although other subversive organizations might be utilized. Qadhafi has shown some sensitivity to US accusations of terrorist sponsorship and would take pains to deny Libyan involvement. (S NF NC OC)
Third Party Reactions
West Europeans
Many West Europeans will consider the exercise to be provocative and lacking strategic or political purpose. Lack of prior consultation could seriously sharpen West European reactions. And a military incident could significantly reduce the chances of any West European participation in a Sinai peacekeeping force. Some of the allies might feel that, without warning, they were being forced to face the possibility of an oil boycott and terrorist attacks against US interests in Western Europe:
-- An oil boycott might not be a major economic threat, but could produce political difficulties as a result of its psychological effect on populations that vividly remember the panic of the 1973-74 boycott.
-- The West Europeans would take the possibility of terrorist attacks of their soil very seriously, since several states have experienced them before. (S NF)
In addition:
-- The United Kingdom, having been asked to help protect US citizens in the event of an emergency in Libya, would be incredulous at a failure by the United States to consult adequately on its intentions to increase the risks of one. London would worry that Qadhafi might retaliate against UK
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Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100536830
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