Back To Institution     University of Wisconsin - Madison
Declassified Documents Reference System HelpSearch TipsGale Databases
Powered by InfoTrac
Home Basic Search:        Advanced Search Search History

Print E-mail Mark this document Results List
Revise Search

Previous Document    _______ Document 30 of 861 _______  Next Document
View Facsimile Previous Page Page: of 9 Next Page
 
Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s).


TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN-NONCORNTRACT-ORCON

hand could be plausibly denied. Links to certain radical
Palestinian groups would make them the obvious vehicles for
such Libyan retaliation, although other subversive organizations
might be utilized. Qadhafi has shown some sensitivity
to US accusations of terrorist sponsorship and would take pains
to deny Libyan involvement. (S NF NC OC)

Third Party Reactions

West Europeans

Many West Europeans will consider the exercise to be
provocative and lacking strategic or political purpose. Lack
of prior consultation could seriously sharpen West European
reactions. And a military incident could significantly reduce
the chances of any West European participation in a Sinai
peacekeeping force. Some of the allies might feel that, without
warning, they were being forced to face the possibility
of an oil boycott and terrorist attacks against US interests
in Western Europe:

-- An oil boycott might not be a major economic threat,
but could produce political difficulties as a result
of its psychological effect on populations that
vividly remember the panic of the 1973-74 boycott.

-- The West Europeans would take the possibility of
terrorist attacks of their soil very seriously,
since several states have experienced them before.
(S NF)

In addition:

-- The United Kingdom, having been asked to help protect
US citizens in the event of an emergency in
Libya, would be incredulous at a failure by the
United States to consult adequately on its intentions
to increase the risks of one. London would
worry that Qadhafi might retaliate against UK

6

TOP SECRET UMBRA


Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.


Document Number: CK3100536830



Top of Page


DISCLAIMER:
Best copy possible from original. Illegible text has been omitted. Page numbers correlate to pages displayed, not original pagination.

View Facsimile Previous Page Page: of 9 Next Page
 

Home  |  Advanced Search  |  Help  |  Search Tips  |  About  |  Gale Databases  |  Contact Us  |  Revise Search  |  Results List  |  Search History  |  Comments


Gale, Cengage LearningCopyright and Terms of Use