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citizens, particularly if he views British help
 to Americans in Libya as signifying overall UK-US
 collusion in the exercise.

-- France has been more supportive of Camp David than
 other West European states but would not understand
 why Washington would choose to complicate an already
 volatile Middle East situation. Mitterrand would
 be displeased at US disregard for his intentions
 to attempt to improve relations with Libya. Any
 incident--with or without consultation--would set
 back efforts to coordinate US and French North
 African policy.

-- Italy would worry more about the safety of Italians
 in Libya and of Libyans and Americans in Italy than
 about the immediate economic effects of an oil boycott.

-- Greece would also be concerned for the safety of
 Greek workers in Libya. Opposition leader Papandreou
 might use the US action--and Libyan reaction to
 it--as ammunition in his electoral campaign against
 close Greek ties to the United States. (S NF)

Arab World

Reaction by and within other Arab and Islamic states to
 any exercise-related incident will largely depend on whether
 expanded hostilities ensue and on the preexisting orientation
 of particular nations toward the Qadhafi regime. Most governments-- Egypt,
 Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia--have
 little love for Libya and probably would be pleased to see
 Qadhafi embarrassed. Others, like Iraq, Algeria, and possibly
 Jordan could be privately satisfied yet [Illegible text] hostile.
 (S NF)

But governmental perceptions in the Arab world may be
 quite different from those of the man in the street. Qadhafi's
 Bedouin moralizing strikes a responsive chord in many Muslims.
 Some will doubtless draw parallels between the Sadat-Begin
 meeting which preceded the Israeli strike against Iraq and
 the recent state visit of the Egyptian President to Washington.

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