Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s).
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that serious US-Libyan fighting results, there could be a groundswell of popular outrage in support of an "Arab-Muslim brother"--even such a black sheep as Qadhafi. In such a case, Libya could reap substantial sympathy as an aggrieved underdeveloped nation being bullied by a superpower with links to the "Zionist enemy." These perceptions and particularly their detrimental impact on Sadat's regime make more imperative the question of advance consultation with Egypt. (S NF)
Additionally, the present poor state of Libyan relations with other Arab states could be given a boost. States like Algeria whose ties with Libya have been progressively loosened might feel obliged to express support for Qadhafi. (S NF)
Reaction of Libyan Populace
The Libyan people will learn only as much of the US exercise, and any incident, as their government wishes them to know. Their reaction will be manipulated, and might well include mob scenes--either simple demonstractions or actual attacks on US personnel inside Libya. Their reaction is less significant, however, than the reaction of the Libyan military--which may well have suffered casualties in an incident. The Intelligence Community believes that the reaction of the Libyan military could take either of two opposing forms:
-- The military could rally around the Qadhafi regime, as happened during the border war with Egypt in the summer of 1977, an incident which aborted an extensive plot within the Libyan military.
-- Or, because of increased disaffection with the regime in the past several years, the military could turn against Qadhafi.
We do not have enough evidence of the state of mind within the Libyan military to choose between the two alternatives, although we do believe the military is less likely to rally around the regime than it was in 1977. (S NF)
Soviet Response
The Soviets will move quickly to exploit the situation to fan Libyan apprehensions about the United States and to undercut US arguments that the USSR is the major threat to the Middle East. Coming on the heels of the Reagan-Sadat
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Intelligence assessment of Libya's reaction to a planned 8/18-8/20/81 U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Issues include: Libyan tactical military options; Libyan nonmilitary options; reactions from West European and Arab countries; reaction of the Libyan populace; the Soviet response. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Aug 10, 1981. Date Declassified: Feb 23, 2001. Complete. 9 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100536832
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