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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 13-10-68 entitled: "Communist China's ICBM [Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile [SLBM] Programs." This document assesses the nature and size of China's weapons"Communist China's ICBM and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Programs". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Sep 19, 1968. Date Declassified: Aug 25, 2004. Complete. 11 page(s).
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a maximum of three or four boats could be constructed by 1975 and be equipped with missiles with a range of 350 miles or so. But the G-class submarine probably would be able to fire only when on the surface, and the Chinese would have major problems operating far from their bases. Hence we believe that the Chinese will not look to diesel-powered missile submarines as a means of threatening US territory. We estimate that the Chinese will not be able to develop a nuclear-powered submarine before the late 1970's at the earliest.
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3.3(b)(1), 6.2(c) COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) no. 13-10-68 entitled: "Communist China's ICBM [Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile [SLBM] Programs." This document assesses the nature and size of China's weapons"Communist China's ICBM and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Programs". Report. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Sep 19, 1968. Date Declassified: Aug 25, 2004. Complete. 11 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100566293
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