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and to produce in quantity the components of advanced weapons in
 a country possessing only a small pool of trained manpower and few
 sophisticated industrial plants and machines. The advantages to
 China of following the pioneering work of others and the benefits
 of being able to obtain much useful data, materials, and equipment
 from Japanese and Western sources have not, and we think for some
 time will not, offset these basic shortcomings.

5. All this is not to say, of course, that Chinese advanced
 weapons programs are doomed to stagnation, or continuous delays.
 Peking has already made substantial investments in its efforts to
 develop an ICBM and a thermonuclear warhead and the program is
 moving forward. But it does suggest caution in estimating the
 probable rate of progress over the next few years, particularly
 with respect to the production and deployment of complex missile
 systems.

6. Present evidence suggests that pad B-1 could be ready
 for use by the end of this year or early in 1969, and flight
 testing could begin, assuming that test vehicles are ready.
 From whatever time the Chinese begin testing we estimate it would
 take at least three years to achieve an initial operational

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3.3(b)(1),
 6.2(c)
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