Assessment of the fighting in the Saravane area of Laos. Lao military sources report substantial concentrations of North Vietnamese troops along Routes 23 and 16. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Feb 14, 1968. Date Declassified: Apr 11, 1997. Sanitized. Complete. 4 page(s).
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taking the provincial capital, at what would probably prove to be a relatively small price.
It is also possible that the airfield at Saravane plays some role in Communist intentions. It is a 4,800 foot laterite strip which conceivably could be used for staging North Vietnamese fighters-interceptors for operations in South Vietnam. DRV IL-14s could also use the field, but Hanoi's IL-28 bomber aircraft could probably not be effectively flown into and out of the strip.
We would rate continued strong Communist military pressure on at least the environs of Saravane as a very strong possibility; an attack on the town itself is about a fifty-fifty proposition at present.
Official sources:
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7 Feb 68.
TOP SECRET 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) CONF. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) CONF. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) CONF. TOP SECRET 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) CONF. COPY LBJ LIBRARY
Assessment of the fighting in the Saravane area of Laos. Lao military sources report substantial concentrations of North Vietnamese troops along Routes 23 and 16. Memo. Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Feb 14, 1968. Date Declassified: Apr 11, 1997. Sanitized. Complete. 4 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2008.
Document Number: CK3100127551
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