G. J. Popek and C. S. Kline @ UCLA
ACM Computing Surveys, December 1979, pages 331-356. Only sections 1-3
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Tapping of lines |
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Introduction of forged messages |
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Replay of valid messages |
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Disruption of network |
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Probability of an error being undetected with k check bits is (1/2k) |
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Stream cipher, to cipher a bit of the message, uses:
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Block cipher, to cipher a block of the message, uses:
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Strong stream ciphers are more easily constructed that strong block ciphers |
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Block stream ciphers make updating blocks easy |
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Have a minimum trusted mechanism and minimum centralized authority to reduce the chance of errors |
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Processing on the data is done in clear-text, which must be somehow protected from internal threats |
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Keys may be passed among entities (like capabilities in HYDAR), resulting in sharing the key between entities. Selective revocation of keys is difficult |
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Encryption can detect modification of data, but can't prevent it |
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Key must be maintained as long as the data encrypted with the key are valid
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Initial distribution of keys is difficult since secure distribution depends upon receivers having the key of the sender. This can be broken by securely distributing the key over a previously secure conduit |
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Centralized key control: Fig 1
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Fully distributed key control
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Hierarchical key distribution
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Assume each entity has made its public key known to the key authority (KA) and the key authority has a public key known to all |
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Suppose A and B want to communicate (Fig 2):
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Public keys can be cached, eliminating four of the seven message above |
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Another way is to use certificate of KA |